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Abstract: Since 2001, the federal circuit courts of appeals have remained
split on the propriety of enforcing heightened standard of review clauses
contained in arbitration agreements governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act (the "FAA"). After reviewing the history of arbitral awards and the text,
structure, and legislative history of the FAA as well as the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FAA, this Note proposes a resolution to the
heightened-review circuit split, which is consistent with the FAA's pro-
arbitration policy and U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This Note's
proposed resolution would require courts to reject heightened-review
clauses through application of the extraordinary circumstances test that
the U.S. Supreme Court developed hi U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. a Boar
Mall Partnership. This Note argues that the adoption of Bonner Malts
extraordinary circumstances test will protect judicial integrity and preserve
arbitration as a viable litigation alternative for the entire legal conununity.
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the Kyocera Corporation, citing payment and shipping
disputes, desired to restructure a multi-million dollar disk drive pro-
duction contract with Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc.' Thereaf-
ter, the parties decided to continue their relationship and to settle any
future disputes through final and binding arbitration. 2 Under the
1 Sec Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 989-90 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en bane).
2 See id. at 990 & nn.1-2, 991. In Kyocera. the parties conceded their intent to have an
arbitrator resolve contractual disputes. Id. at 990 n.2. Although the parties' agreement did
not state specifically that the decision of the arbitrator was final and binding, this intent is
coextensive with the decision to arbitrate. See id. Indeed, a comprehensive treatise on
commercial arbitration states that "Nrbitration ... involves a final determination of dis-
putes.... 110 is based on a voluntary agreement of the parties, made before the arbitra-
tion ... is instituted, to submit a dispute for the binding decision of the arbitrator."
1 LARRY E. EnmormsoN, DoMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §§ 1:1, 1:3 (3d ed. 2003)
(citation omitted). When parties opt for arbitration, they voluntarily forgo resolving dis-
putes through mediation or conciliation, the results of which are not binding. See id. § 1:3.
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Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), a federal district court can vacate
or nullify arbitration awards only for severe procedural irregularities,
such as fraud or lack of a fair hearing in the arbitral proceeding. 3 Be-
cause vacatur review under the FAA is an extremely narrow inquiry,
the parties agreed to include a heightened standard of review clause
in their agreement.4
 The clause directed a federal district court to
conduct an extensive factual and legal review of an arbitral award
upon either party's motion for vacatur. 5
 Following a subsequent arbi-
tration in which it was ordered to pay more than $200 million in
damages, Kyocera invoked the heightened-review clause. 6
After sixteen years of protracted litigation, in 2003, in KyoceraGo. v. Prudential-Bathe Trade Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en Banc, held unanimously that enforcing the height-
ened-review clause was unconstitutional because doing so would sub-
vert Congress's plenary power to establish the procedures of the fed-
eral courts.? This was the latest and most definitive salvo in a circuit
split on the enforceability of heightened-review clauses that has per-
sisted since 2001.8
Beginning in the late twentieth century, arbitration became an
increasingly prevalent form of alternative dispute resolution in the
3 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (2000); sec also Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997-98 (setting forth section
10 vacatur grounds and stating, "[T]hese grounds afford an extremely limited review
authority, a limitation that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unneces-
sary public intrusion into private arbitration procedures."); Gupta v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 274
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that judicial review of arbitral award is among nar-
rowest under law). For a brief summary of section 10 of the FAA, see infra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
Sec Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 991; sec also, e.g., liatz v. Feinberg, 167 F. Stipp. 2d 556, 563
(S.D.N.1: 2001) (reasoning that vacatur review under section 10 is extremely limited be-
cause extensive review would subvert the "twin goals of arbitration, namely; settling dis-
putes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.") (quoting Dirussa v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 827 (2d Cir. 1997)).
5 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 990-91, 994.
6 Id. at 990-91.
7 Sec id. at 991-94.
a See id. at 998-1000. The circuit split on the propriety of heightened-review clauses has
attracted a considerable amount of scholarly debate. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, lifanage-
Litigants? The Overlooked Prnblem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGs
1199, 1244, 1250 (2000) (describing circuit split and proposing resolution); Lee Goldman,
Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HAAN% NEGo-r. L. REV. 171, 174-79
(2003) (reviewing pro- and anti-heightened-review precedents); Eric van Gin kel, Refraining
thc Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial Review: Arbitral Appeal vs. lOcatur, 3 PENN. Dun'.
RES01.. L.(. 157, 160, 161, 178-79 n.113 (2003) (citing previous studies and reasoning that
circuit split involves proper conception of arbitral finality).
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commercial, employment, and consumer con texts. 9 Parties were at.
tracted to arbitration because they could obtain a final and binding
judgment without incurring the costs, delays, and publicity inherent
in litigation." These benefits were counterbalanced, however, by the
FAA and the precedents interpreting it, which virtually assured that
courts would treat arbitral awards as final judgments." Courts had
long recognized that finality was the crux of the arbitral bargain be-
cause if awards were precatory, then arbitration would be a mere
prelude to, and not a substitute for, litigation." Although careful post
hoc judicial scrutiny might render the correct. result in a particular
dispute, this unitary benefit was substantially outweighed by the en-
couragement of vexatious litigation, which would tend to discourage
parties' future utilization of arbitration."
Accordingly, vacatur under' the FAA was rare." In response to
the unwillingness of courts to overturn the results of their preferred
method of dispute resolution, parties like Kyocera and Prudential'
sought to derive arbitral benefits and guard against the possibility of
hugely disproportionate or legally erroneous awards with height-
9 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 8, at 174, 199.
la Id. at 171.
" See, e.g., First Options of Chi„ Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942, 943 (1995). In First
Options of Chicago. Inc. v. Kaplan, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following:
[A] party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court's
decision about the merits of its dispute.... But, where the party has agreed to
arbitrate, he or she, in effect, has relinquished much of that right's practical
value. The party still can ask a court to review the arbitrator's decision, but the
court will only set that decision aside in very unusual circumstances.
Id. at 942 (emphasis added). The Court cited section 10 of the FAA and the "manifest dis-
regard for the law" standard as examples of very unusual circumstances. Id. The grounds
for vacating an arbitral award pursuant to section 10 of the FAA are similar to those gov-
erning the vacant'. of final judgments. Sec Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d
1378, 1383 n.8 (11th Cir. 1988); sec also van Ginkel, supra note 8, at 189 (noting that vaca-
tur grounds under section 10 of FAA and Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are similar). Compare 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (stating that award may be vacated for fraud,
lack of fair hearing, or arbitrator misconduct), with Frit. R. On'. 60(b) (permitting vaca-
tur for fraud, lack of fair hearing, or hi the interest of justice).
12 See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854); see also Office of Supply,
Gov't of Republic of Korea v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (hold-
ing that limited review ensures viability of arbitration as litigation alternative).
13 See Schoch v. Infousa, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Eljer Mfg.,
Inc. v. Kowin Dec. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994)); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline
Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935, 936 n.7 (10th Cir, 2001); see also Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co.,
714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that under FAA, courts must not encourage
practices that increase cost and undermine finality of arbitration).
14 See 4 IAN R. MAcN Eli, sri' AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.1.4 (Supp. 1999).
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erred-review clauses.° Such devices blended arbitration's informal
and inexpensive adjudicatory system with the federal courts' circum-
spect legal and factual analysis as a security against legally and/or
factually erroneous awards.°
Prior to 2003, several "pro-heightened-review" circuit courts of
appeals enforced heightened-review clauses because the U.S. Su-
preme Court's FAA precedents declared a pro-arbitration policy,
which required enforcing arbitration agreements according to their
terms.° Conversely, "anti-heightened-review" courts reasoned that the
FAA was intended to preserve arbitration as a litigation alternative. 18
Therefore, because heightened-review clauses encouraged litigation,
anti-heightened-review courts held that the clauses were incompati-
ble with the FAA's pro-arbitration policy and unenforceable.° In con-
trast to both of these approaches, the Kyocera court moved the
heightened-review debate away from its preoccupation with the con-
tours of pro-arbitration policy." Focusing on judicial integrity, the
Ninth Circuit held that the federal courts simply could not conform
their procedures to contractually mandated processes that contra-
vened both the U.S. Constitution and the FAA's text. 21 Thus, height-
ened-review vacatur requests are currently subject to review under
three variant analytical frameworks. 22
As a result of the heightened-review circuit split, prospective ar-
bitrants engaged in interstate commerce in pro-heightened-review
circuits are required to bargain around the heightened-review issue,
whereas similarly situated actors in anti-heightened-review circuits are
not." In contrast, a standardized framework for analyzing height-
15 See Goldman, supra note 8, at 172-73.
16 See
17 See. e.g., Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir.
1995). For a review of pro-heightened-review precedents, see ittfm notes 144-164 and ac-
companying text.
18 See, e.g., Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932, 933, 936. For a review of anti-heightened-review
precedents, see infra notes 178-199 and accompanying text.
18 Sec id. at 935, 936 n.7. For a review of BOTVC11, see infra notes 178-190 and accompany-
ing text.
20 Compare Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994 (deciding FAA specifies exclusive grounds for vacat-
ing awards), with Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933, 935 (concluding that FAA's pro-arbitration policy
and U.S. Supreme Court precedents prohibit heightened-review clauses).
21 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994, 1000.
22 Compare, e.g., id. (applying textual/constitutional framework), and Bowen, 254 F.3d at
935-37 (utilizing policy approach to support non-enforcement), with Gateway, 64 F.3d at
996-97 (using policy approach to support enforcement).
28 Compare, e.g., Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000 (concluding that federal courts may not va-
cate award pursuant to contractual standard), with Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v, Kayser,
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ened-review requests would lead to predictable results, which would
increase both bargaining and judicial efficiency. 24 Moreover, judicial
integrity is enhanced when courts apply uniform analytical frame-
works con sisten tly. 25
This Note argues that the extraordinary circumstances test,
which applies when parties seek to vacate judicial final judgments eq-
uitably, should furnish the proper rubric for reviewing the validity of
heightened-review clauses. 26 In 1994, in U.S. Banco? Mortgage Co. v.
Bonner Mall Partners/tip, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the extraor-
dinary circumstances test to defeat an attempt to vacate an appellate
judgment pursuant to a private settlement agreement.° Part I of this
Note reviews the history of arbitral awards and the text, structure, and
legislative history of the FAA and the precedents interpreting the
Act. 28 A review of these materials indicates that the FAA requires
courts to enforce arbitral awards as final judgments to maintain the
viability of arbitration as a mode of alternative dispute resolution. 29
Part II presents the federal circuit courts of appeals' heightened-review
jurisprudence and the Second Circuit. Court of Appeals' decision in
2003, in Hoeft v. MIT Group, Inc., which applied Bonner Malts rationale
to strike clown a decreased standard of review clause." This Part. also
presents two scholarly proposals for a uniform heightened-review ju-
risprudence.si Because the Hoeft court left open the question of
whether Banner Malts extraordinary circumstances test should apply to
heightened standard of review clauses, Part HI carefully considers the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Bonner Mall." In addition, this Part
reviews the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in 1983, in Merit
Insurance Co. v. Leatherlry Insurance Co., in which the court applied a test
similar to Bonner Malts extraordinary circumstances test to defeat a
request to vacate an arbitral award pursuant. to a contractual proce-
dure."
257 F.3d 287, 292-.93, 296, 297 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that pro-heightened-review
precedent allows sophisticated parties to bargain around FAA's default vacatur standards).
24 See Roadway, 257 F.3d at 296-97.
25 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1994);
Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 2003).
28 See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26-29.
27 Id.
28 See infra notes 40-137 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 293-324 and accompanying text.
sO See infra notes 138-211 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 212-223 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 230-243 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 245-270 and accompanying text.
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Finally; Part IV critically analyzes the pro-heightened-review posi-
tion and rejects it in favor of the extraordinary circumstances tests`
After reviewing the history of arbitral awards and the text, structure,
and legislative history of the FAA, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the FAA, Part IV.A concludes that the FAA's protec-
tion of arbitral finality is as valuable to the legal community as the final .
judgments at issue in Bonner Malt" Part IV.B then explains the analogy
between heightened-review clauses and the contractual vacatur request
at issue in Bonner Mall." Part liV.0 critiques and rejects two prior schol-
arly attempts to standardize a framework for reviewing the propriety of
heightened-review clauses. 37
 Unlike these prior attempts, the extraor-
dinary circumstances test is both consistent with U.S. Supreme Court
precedent and the FAA's pro-arbitration policy because it protects
finality—the primary institutional advantage of arbitration—and con-
comitantly permits parties to structure their arbitral proceedings as
they see fit. 39
 Finally; Part IV.D summarizes the foregoing analysis. 39
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: HISTORY, TEXT, STRUCTURE,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND PRECEDENT
A. History: Finality as a Basic Assa inption
To determine which analytical framework should apply to
heightened-review vacatur requests, it is essential to develop an un-
derstanding of arbitral awards and the FAA. 49
 Modern commercial
arbitration is an outgrowth of informal, medieval mercantile adjudica-
tions.'" Then, as now, the practice was designed as a litigation avoid-
ance mechanism.42
 Parties choose to arbitrate to avoid the costs and
delays inherent in litigation and often to maintain a modicum of pri-
vacy over sensitive matters. 43
 Like traditional litigation, arbitration Id-
34
 For a summary of Part IV's conclusions, see infra notes 364-379 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 281-324 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 325-342 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 343-363 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 348-363 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 364-379 and accompanying text.
40 Cf. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,948 (1995) (holding, in FAA con-
text, that standards of review should be crafted in accordance with institutional advantages).
41 Cole, supra note 8. at 1235.
43 Compare EDMONDSON, supra note 2, § 1:1 (stating that modern arbitrants seek final re-
sults and avoidance of costs and delays of litigation), with. Cole, supra note 8, at 1236 (reason-
ing that medieval arbitrants sought to achieve final results through informal procedures).
48 EDMONDSON, supra note 2, §§ 1:1, 1:4.
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timately results in a decision that is final and binding on both arbi-
trants; however, the entire arbitral proceeding is a "creature of con-
tract,"** Arbitrants choose the arbitrator and determine which proce-
dural roles will circumscribe the arbitrator's decision making. 45 Thus,
although arbitration is speedier and more cost efficient than litiga-
tion, arbitrants sacrifice statutory and common-law procedural, evi-
dentiary, and appellate rights that have developed to ensure fair and
just litigation.46
Ostensibly, arbitrants seek to eliminate any unnecessary judicial
interference in their disputes. 47 Until the FAA was passed in 1925,
however, the federal courts were loath to relinquish their jurisdiction
to arbitrators. 48 As more commercial actors opted for arbitration in
the nineteenth century, federal courts crafted the ouster doctrine,
which forbade courts from granting specific performance to execu-
tory arbitration agreements.49 The ouster doctrine presumed that it
would be inequitable to enforce a contract that ousted judicial juris-
diction in favor of a tribunal that was unbound by legal norms." Be-
cause courts applying the ouster doctrine did not attempt a systematic
effort to justify the doctrine, authorities are split on whether it was a
defensive reaction to arbitration's increasing prominence or an effort
to prevent inequitable adhesion contracts. 51
" See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942, 943 (holding that parties may determine which issues to
arbitrate and that such determination essentially forecloses judicial decision on the merits
of the dispute); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57-58,
64 (1995) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989) and holding that court will enforce an award issued pursuant to arbi-
tral procedures).
45 EDMONDSON, supra note 2, § 1:1.	 •
46 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942; UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992,
998 (8th Cir. 1998). But see Action Indus., Inc., v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d
337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that parties may contract for heightened judicial review).
47 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942, 943; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Meirel Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983)).
48 See, e.g., United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co„ 222 F, 1006,
1010-11 (SIENA: 1915).
49 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1898); Cole, supra note 8, at 1237.
5° See Mitchell, 90 F. at 642 (stating that courts will not enforce contracts that "oust the
jurisdiction of the courts, and substitute for them an extra-legal tribunal of their own crea-
tion, with power to finally and conclusively decide Fr a disputel").
51 See Southland Corp„ 465 U.S. at 13 (citing legislative history for proposition that
ouster doctrine was premised on jurisdictional jealousy); United States Asphalt, 222 F. at
1010-11 (stating that courts would not forsake jurisdiction unless compelled by statute).
Comptur IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 60-61 (1992) (concluding that the
ultimate rationale for ouster doctrine is unclear), with Amyl Schmitz, Ending a Sind Bowl:
Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis. 37 GA. L. REv. 123, 138 & n.80
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Despite its anti-arbitration tendencies, the ouster doctrine did
not infect the federal judiciary's entire analysis of arbitration agree-
ments." Indeed, by 1924, the federal courts' treatment of arbitration
agreements largely depended on the procedural posture of an arbi-
tration." If an arbitral proceeding was concluded and a final award
rendered, courts would enforce the award. 54 Thus, although the
ouster doctrine obstructed arbitral practice, the courts also recog-
nized the inherent unfairness and inefficiency in overturning the re-
sults of a voluntary arbitration that the parties intended as final and
binding.55 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this rationale in 1854, in
Burche11 v. Marsh, when it held that arbitral awards could not be over-
turned for legal or factual errors." Burch& concerned a dispute be-
tween two interstate retail firms that agreed to settle all contractual
disputes in arbitration. 57 The Court reasoned that awards were final
judgments:
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the
matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As a
mode of settling disputes, [arbitration] should receive every
encouragement from courts of equity. If the award is within
the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbi-
trators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of
equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A
contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of
the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties,
and would make an award the commencement, not the end,
of litigation. 58
(2002) (arguing that ouster doctrine was pretext for judicial hostility to arbitration, but
citing authorities that disagree).
52 See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349, 350 (1854); Karthaus v. Illas y Fer-
rer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 222, 226-27, 230 (1828); see also Red Cross Line v. Ad. Fruit Co., 264
U.S. 109, 121 (1924) (citing Borthelland Karthaus for proposition that arbitral awards were
enforceable in federal courts).
53 Sec Red Gros Line, 264 U.S. at 121.
54 See, e.g., Borchelt, 58 U.S. at 349; Karthaus, 26 U.S. at 226-27, 230; see also MAGNEu.,
supra note 51, at 19-20 (explaining early American courts' distinction between enforcing
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards).
55 Sec Borchelt, 58 U.S. at 349; see also, e.g., White Star Mining Co. v. Hultherg, 77 N.E.
327, 335-36 (III. 1906) (citing Borchelt and numerous state court decisions for proposition
that awards could not be vacated for error of fact or law).
56 Bit rchell, 58 U.S. at 349.
57 Id. at 344-45.
58 Id. at 349.
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Thus, as early as 1854, it was well settled that searching judicial review
of arbitral awards was incompatible with arbitration because it un-
dermined finality."
Contrary to its clear pro-award stance, however, the Burchell Court
made clear that arbitral awards were not always final." Indeed, the
Court reasoned an award could be vacated for gross procedural irregu-
larities such as bias or lack of due process. 61 Similarly, post-1854 courts
did not always defer to arbitral awards; awards could be vacated for
fraud, corruption, or arbitrator misconduct. 62 Nevertheless, as in Bur-
Melt, courts refused to analyze the legal or factual bases of awards."
Accordingly, early, modern vacatur review was decidedly limited: courts
only sought to ensure that arbitral awards were derived from the fair,
neutral proceeding contemplated in arbitration agreements."
59 See id.; see also Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns Ch. 339, 361 (N.Y Ch. 1817),
quoted in MAGNF.n., supra note 51, at 19. Before Btorhell was decided, in 1817, in Underhill v.
Van Cortlandt, the New Ibrk Court of Chancery, the highest court of equity in New York
before 1848, reasoned that arbitration awards were final judgments. See MACNE/J„ supra
note 51, at 19. The Underhill Court stated the following:
If every award must be made conformable to what would have been the
judgment of [the] „ Court in the case, it would render arbitrations useless
and vexatious, and a source of great litigation; for it very rarely happens that
both parties are satisfied. The decision by arbitration is the decision of a tri-
bunal of the parties' own choice and election. It is a popular, cheap, conven-
ient, and domestic mode of trial, which the courts have always regarded with
liberal indulgence; they have never exacted from these unlettered tribunals,
this rusticum forum, the observance of technical rule and formality. They
have only looked to see if the proceedings were honestly and fairly con-
ducted, and if that appeared to be the case, they have uniformly and univer-
sally refused to interfere with the judgment of the arbitrators.
2 johns Ch. at 361, quoted in MAcNEIL, supra note 51, at 19.
60 See 1314 rchell, 58 U.S. at 350.
61 Sec id.
62 See, e.g., White Star, 77 N.E. at 336. In 1906, in White Star, the Illinois Supreme Court
narrowly interpreted an arbitration agreement that assumed issuance of a legally correct
award. See id. at 337. The court only reviewed the award for procedural irregularities be-
cause a more thorough legal error review would defeat the purpose of the arbitration
agreement—litigation avoidance. See id. The White Star court also noted that the parties'
agreement did not expressly provide for judicial review of the arbitrator's legal conclu-
sions; however, the court stated that contractually heightened judicial review would be
equally impermissible because it would 'render this and all similar arbitration absolutely
futile." Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
63 See id.; see also MACNEIL, supra note 51, at 21-22 (finding that outside of ouster doc-
trMe, federal arbitration law accorded with state law).
64 See, e.g., &tad!, 58 U.S. at 349.
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B. Text, Structure, and Legislative History:
Presuming and Preserving Finality
1. Text: Inherent Ambiguity and Seeming Judicial Expansion
Although the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Burch& seemed
to foreclose searching judicial review of final arbitral awards, in 1925,
Congress enacted express, limited vacatur grounds in sections 9 and
10 of the FAA.65
 Section 9 of the FAA ensures private compliance with
final arbitration awards through judicial coercion. 66
 It allows an arbi-
trant to petition a federal district court for a judgment confirming the
award within one year after it is entered. 67
 If the award is confirmed,
the court adopts the judgment of the arbitrator, and the award be-
comes fully enforceable at law.66
 Section 9's mandate is unambiguous:
"[T] he court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated .
as prescribed in section[] 10 ... of this title."69
 Section 10 renders sec-
tion 9's otherwise clear mandate uncertain; it states that a court "may"
vacate an award because of procedural irregularities in the arbitral
proceeding." Under section 10, an award may be vacated for arbitral
fraud, misconduct, undue means, bias, lack of a fair and impartial
hearing, or if arbitrators exceed their powers as set forth in the arbi-
tration agreement. 71
66
 See id, at 349; 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (2000); see also Cole, supra note 8, at 1255 (arguing
that enactment of section 10 was superfluous because the common law of arbitration al-
ready required limited vacatur review). But see Schmitz, supra note 51, at 149 (arguing that
FAA's drafters rejected searching judicial review of arbitral awards as inimical to purposes
of arbitration).
66 See 9 U.S.C. § 9; see also Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co. 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th
Cir. 1983) (reasoning that FAA authorizes federal courts to make arbitration effective
through award enforcement).
67 9 U.S.C. § 9.
66 Id. §§ 9, 13.
69 Id. § 9 (emphasis added).
70 Id. § 10 (emphasis added); see also Cole, supra note 8, at 1258 (implying that permis-
sive language in section 10 renders it susceptible to a pro- and anti-heightened-review in-
terpretation); Goldman, supra note 8, at 180-81 (same).
71
 FAA section 10 provides, in pertinent part, that
the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made
may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration: (1) Where •
 the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the ar-
bitrators, or either of them. (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of miscon-
duct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause showis, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
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In addition to vacating an award under section 10, the U.S. Su-
preme Court and all the courts of appeals, except the Fourth Circuit,
have developed non-statutory standards of review to vacate awards
that were rendered in manifest disregard for the law, violated an ex-
pressed public policy, or otherwise were arbitrary and capricious. 72
Although such action would appear to be non-statutory, these com-
mon-law rules may actually represent courts setting aside awards when
arbitrators exceed their powers in violation of section 10(a) (4). 75
Even under a non-textual interpretation, • it is well settled that these
grounds are construed narrowly. 74 Accordingly, an award's failure to
survive a court's circumspect legal or factual review would be a wholly
insufficient ground for non-statutory vacatur. 75
2. Structure: Clear Division of Labor Between Arbitrators and Courts
In contrast to the ambiguous text of sections 9 and 10 of the FAA,
the Act's structure reveals an unequivocal decision to distinguish
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submit-
ted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10.
72 See, e.g., Kaplan, 519 U.S. at 942 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), for
proposition that court may vacate award that is in "manifest disregard for the law"); Pruden-
tial-Bache Secs., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 241 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that award may be
vacated if arbitrator's decision would violate explicit public policy that is well-defined, domi-
nant, and capable of being ascertained from the laws and legal precedents); Lifecare
Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 435 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that award can be vacated if
"there is no ground whatsoever for" arbitrator's decision and Elms, award is arbitrary and
capricious). For a thorough review of non-statutory vacatur grounds, see generally Stephen
L. Fla)ford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Rea-
soned Awards and Judicial Standards for l'acatur, 66 GEO. WAsn. L. ItEv. 443, 461-92 (1998).
78 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (4). Indeed, in 2003, in Kyocera Corporation v. Prudential-Bathe
Trade Services. Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the manifest disregard
for the law standard was derived front section 10(a) (4). 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003);
See ed.SO STEPHAN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.45 (2001) (reasoning
that non-statutory vacatur grounds are outgrowth of courts' authority under section
10(a) (4) of FAA to overturn award in which arbitrator has exceeded his or her powers).
74 See, e.g., Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990).
75 See, e.g., id.; see also Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998 (reasoning that manifest disregard for
the law and completely irrational standards are designed to prevent substantive judicial
review, and stating that It] hese grounds afford an extremely limited review authority ...
that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary intrusion into pri-
vate arbitration procedures"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808
F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that under manifest disregard standard, vacatur
requires that arbitrator's legal error be so obvious that average arbitrator would instantly
notice it).
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sharply between the institutional roles of arbitrators and courts. 76 Sec-
tions 2 through 5 of the FAA set forth a pro-arbitration policy and ex-
pressly require courts to compel arbitration in accordance with terms
set forth in parties' agreements. 77
 Conversely, when parties seek judi-
cial review of an arbitration award, sections 9 and 10 of the FAA instruct
federal courts to conduct their review in accordance with statutory pro-
cedures. 78
 In 1995, in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. and
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned
that the FAA's demarcation between the arbitral and judicial roles
reflects the consensual nature of arbitration. 79
 In these cases, the Court
held that under the FAA, federal courts are required to compel arbitra-
tion and enforce arbitral awards in accordance with arbitral agree-
ments. 8° Thus, if parties agree to arbitrate an issue and an arbitrator
decides the issue pursuant to contractual rules, a court must confirm
the arbitration's results absent egregious procedural irregularities. 8i
3. Legislative History: The Lack Thereof and Its Implications
The clear demarcation of arbitral and judicial authority set forth
in the FAA's text and structure corresponds with Congress's primary
purpose in passing the FAA—overruling the ouster doctrine to secure
specific enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 82
 Beyond
this purpose, however, congressional intent is unclear; indeed, there is
no explicit legislative history concerning sections 9 and 10 of the
FAA.85
 The FAA's status as "rubber stamped" legislation explains its
lack of legislative history; Congress did not draft the FAA—instead it
76
 Sec VO/t, 489 U.S. at 474-75 (reasoning that under section 4 of FAA, a court only has
authority to compel arbitration in the manner provided for in (the parties' agreement)"); see also
Mastrohnono, 514 U.S. at 57-58 (quoting Volt and holding that FAA only ensures enforce-
ment of awards rendered in accordance with parties' agreement); Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000
(reasoning that under Volt, courts must compel arbitration pursuant to contract, but that
judicial review of arbitral award is limited to statutory %Timm' .
 grounds); Bowen v: Amoco
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,935 (10th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing section 4 of the FAA front
section 9 on ground that section 4 requires court to issue order in accordance with parties'
agreement and section 9 mandates statutory analysis).
77 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-5; Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-75, 476; Moses H. Cone Itiem'l Hosp., 460 U.S.
at 24.
78 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
79 Sec Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942,943; Mo./rob/ono, 514 U.S. at 57 (quoting ibit, 489 U.S. at
479).
82 Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942,943; Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57-58.
al See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942-43; Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57-58,64.
82 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,219-20 & n.6 (1985) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 68.96, at 1-2 (1924)); Southland corp., 465 U.S. at 13 (same).
as See Cole, supra note 8, at 1255.
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adopted a draft statute prepared by the American Bar Association
(the "ABA").94 To derive legislative intent from this "statute of adhe-
sion," Professor MacNeil, author of the leading treatise on the FAA,
suggests analyzing both Congress's stated understanding of the ABA
draft and the intent of the ABA. 85
The express legislative history reflects that in addition to desiring
specific enforcement of arbitral agreements, Congress believed that
the FAA would allow parties to avoid expensive litigation and would
concomitantly increase judicial economy." There was little debate
over the FAA; in particular, there was no discussion regarding judicial
review of arbitration awards. 87 Given the legal framework in which
Congress was operating, this seeming consensus is not surprising; by
1925, it was well settled that arbitration awards could be vacated only
for procedural irregularities. 88
In contrast to the ambiguity surrounding the express congres-
sional understanding of sections 9 and 10 of the FAA, the ABA took
definitive steps to confine judicial review of arbitral awards, 89 The
ABA sought to avoid any unnecessary judicial interference with arbi-
tration by crafting a modern arbitration statute—one that required
the enforcement of pre-dispute 'arbitration agreements and that also
provided explicit procedures for confirming and vacating awards."
Significantly, the ABA modeled its draft on the New York Arbitration
Law of 1920; this choice had important implications for the FAA's va-
catur provisions. 91
The New York statute assumed the application of the New York
Code of Civil Procedure, which mandated the limited standards of ju-
dicial review that are set forth in section 10 of the FAA. 92 Although the
ABA's initial draft neglected to mandate this limited vacatur procedure
84 SCCMACNEIL, 511p117 note 51. at 107-08: MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 14, § 8.1.
85 MACNEIL, supra note 51, at 108.
8° H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2, quoted in Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-20 & n.6; Bills to Make
Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements of Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Mari-
time Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Joint Hear-
ings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. on the judiciary, 68th Cong. 21 (1924),
quoted in Mex.NEst., supra note 51, at 92.
'47 MActilin. ET AL., supra note 14, §§ 8.1—.2; Cole, supra note 8, at 1255.
Cole, supra note 8, at 1255.
09 See MAGNETS. ET AL., supra note 14, § 8.1; see also Schmitz, supra note 51, at 149-50
(reasoning that FAA's drafters debated and rejected provisions mandating legal error re-
view of arbitral awards).
so Sec MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 14, § 8.1; Schmitz, supra note 51, at 150.
°I MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 14, § 8.1.
92 See id. § 9,3106.
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specifically, the draft that Congress codified expressly adopted the New
York Code's limited vacatur standards. 93 Limited vacatur review was
sharply distinguishable from the vacatur framework mandated under
the two other modern arbitration statutes then in existence. 94 The 1917
Illinois arbitration statute and the English Arbitration Act of 1889 al-
lowed either arbitrant to obtain a definitive judicial ruling on a legal
issue that arose during an arbitration; in addition, under the Illinois
statute, after an arbitrator rendered a final award, either arbitrant
could compel the arbitrator to submit factual conclusions to a court. for
a definitive legal ruling.95
Professor MacNeil, among others, suggests that the rejection of
the Illinois and English models was a deliberate reaction against a
mechanism that conflicted with the well settled understanding that
arbitrators could finally decide legal and factual questions. 98 The shift
of final decision making from arbitrators to courts was an anathema
to the proponents of the FAA and thus, the adoption of the New York
code's limited procedural irregularity vacatur grounds was a conscious
decision to insulate awards from judicial second-guessing. 97
C. The U.S. Supreme Court's Implicit Distinction. Between Arbitral and
Judicial Proceedings and Its Limited Section 10 jurisprudence
The history of arbitration and the text, structure, and legislative
history of the FAA have greatly informed the U.S. Supreme Court's
FAA jurisprudence. 98 The Court has interpreted the FAA as setting
forth a pro-arbitration policy, which requires judicial respect for parties'
arbitral procedures. 99
 Nevertheless, the Court also has reasoned that
the FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not mandate augmenting judicial
93 Sec id. §§ 8.1, 9.3 n.16. Indeed, as Professor MacNeil notes, the FAA's vacatur
grounds are nearly identical to those employed under the New l'ork Arbitration Law of
1920. Id. § 9.3 n.16.
SeeNlAcNEtt., supra note 51, at 31-33.
95 Id. at 32, 37.
96 Sec id. at 34; Schmitz, supra note 51, at 149-50. But see Cole, supra note 8, at 1255
(reasoning that FAA's drafters were unconcerned about judicial review and merely
adopted common-law standard).
97 See MACNEIL, supra note 51, at 33; MAcNEtt. ET AL., supra note 14, § 8.1; Schmitz, su-
pra note 51, at 150.
98 See, e.g., Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-76.
99 Sec id. at 475-76, 479.
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procedures	 to reach pro-arbitration results)" The Court has
not yet decided a case concerning heightened-review clauses) 01
In 1989, in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
FAA does not require that arbitrants utilize particular arbitral proce-
dures)" In Volt, the petitioner sought an order compelling arbitration
while state court litigation relating to the arbitral dispute was pend-
ing. 103 Based on the conclusion that the parties had agreed to conduct
their arbitration under California's arbitration law, which stayed arbi-
tration during any pending litigation, the California courts refused to
compel arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the FAA)" The petitioner
argued that denial of the order was improper because California's
arbitration law directly conflicted with the FAA, which required an
automatic stay of litigation and compelled arbitration)"
The Volt Court held that the FAA's pro-arbitration policy did not
mandate the use of particular arbitral procedures and thus, the parties
could agree to arbitrate pursuant to California law)" Therefore, be-
cause the parties' agreement adopted a procedure that required an
arbitral stay, the lower court's refusal to compel arbitration was consis-
tent with section 4 of the FAA, which requires courts to compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to the terms of arbitral agreements)° 7 In addition, the
Court noted that there was no conflict between federal pro-arbitration
policy and the California law because the arbitral stay rule encouraged
arbitration by minimizing the potential for contradictory arbitral and
judicial judgments)" The Court reasoned that the FAA was not in-
tended to coerce parties into arbitrating; rather, the principal purpose
of the Act was to overcome judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration
agreements according to their terms)" Thus, any efficiency concerns
were offset because Congress intended that parties determine arbitra-
tion's scope and procedure.u° Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower
100 See, e.g., Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 947-48.
101 See Schoch v. Infousa, Inc., 341 F.3d 785 789-90 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 1414 (2004).
1 " See 489 U.S. at 476,479.
V" Id. at 471.
104 See id. at 47]-72.
u" See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (2000); lilt, 489 U.S. at 474.
Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
I" See id. at 475.
108 Id. at 475 n,5, 476.
10° See id. at 478-79.
11° See id. at 479.
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court's decision because it gave effect to the terms of the parties'
agreement within the framework of the FAA's pro-arbitration policy)"
In 1995, in Mastrobuono, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed Volt's
rationale.'" In Mastrobuono, the arbitration agreement contained a
New York choice of law clause." 3 Although New York precedent pre-
cluded arbitrators from granting punitive damages, the petitioner ob-
tained a punitive damages award and sought enforcement.'" The
Court found that the parties intended New York substantive law, not
decisional law, to govern their arbitral proceeding.'" Therefore, the
Court concluded that, under Volt's interpretation of the FAA, the pu-
nitive damages award was enforceable)" Although Mastrobuono ex-
tended Volt's rationale to the confirmation stage, the Court implicitly
stressed Volt's limitations in dicta.'" The Court stated that its decision
in Volt was predicated upon its finding that California's arbitral stay
rule patently encouraged arbitration and thus, fostered the FAA's
pro-arbitration policy." 8
Shortly after Mastrobuono was handed down, in Kaplan, the U.S.
Supreme Court considered whether federal courts or arbitrators
should determine whether a particular dispute was within the scope
of an arbitration agreement.'" The Court reasoned that if an agree-
ment authorized an arbitrator to decide questions of arbitrability then
the parties effectively had relinquished their right to have a federal
court determine the merits of such disputes." 9 Any subsequent judi-
cial review was of little practical value because judicial confirmation of
an arbitrator's decision was all but certain."' To exemplify the "un-
usual circumstances," in which a court might vacate an arbitrator's
award, the Court cited the limited procedural irregularity grounds for
vacatur in section 10 of the FAA and the manifest disregard for the
law vacatur standard. 122 The Court then concluded that the arbitrabil-
ity issue should be decided in accordance with the parties' agree-
1t1 Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
112 Sec Mastrobnono, 514 U.S. at 57.




" 5 Sec id. at 63-64.
16 Sec id. at 57-58, 64.
17 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 53, 57, 64.
118 Id. at 57.
116 Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 941.
126 Id. at 942, 943.
121 Id. at 942.
122 Id.
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ment. 123 The Court opined that this finding was functionally sensible
because arbitration is simply a mechanism for deciding only those
disputes that the parties voluntarily agree to submit to an arbitrator," 4
The Kaplan Court also examined the issue of whether an appel-
late court. should apply a more lenient standard of review to a deci-
sion confirming an arbitration award. 123 Relying on Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals precedent, the petitioner contended that the FAA's
pro-arbitration policy required the use of an abuse of discretion stan-
dard rather than the more stringent clearly erroneous and de novo
review normally conducted by the federal circuit courts of appeals."8
The Court rejected this argument."' First, the Court concluded that.
constructing varying standards of review merely to encourage arbitra-
tion rendered the law unnecessarily complex. 128 Second, the Court
held that standards of review are predicated upon institutional advan-
tages, not their tendency to produce particular results. 123 To illustrate
this point, the Court stated that the decisions of administrative agen-
cies are reviewed for abuse of discretion and implied that this stan-
dard was applied because of agency expertise and statutory authority
to make law. 138 Accordingly, the deferential standard of review applied
to administrative decisions was not developed to reach a particular
result, but to ensure that judicial policy determinations would not. de-
123 Id. at 943.
124 Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 943; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S, 444, 452-
53 (2004) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that arbitrators are well-situated to decide
matters of contractual interpretation because the parties expressly selected them for this
task).
121 Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 947-48.
126 Id. at 941, 948.
127 See id. at 948.
128 See id.
129 See id.
150 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 948 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)). In 1984, in Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
when Congress empowers an administrative agency to oversee a legislative program, it
concomitantly grants that agency the authority to formulate policies and rules to fill legis-
lative gaps. 467 U.S. at 843. If a court finds that Congress so ceded this authority and the
agency's decision making was not arbitrary or capricious, it should uphold the decision of
the agency. Sec id. at 844-45; see also Cole, supra note 8, at 1260 (reasoning that arbitrary
and capricious review of administrative agencies' decisions accords judicial respect to
agencies' decision-making authority).
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feat congressional intent."' The Court stated that courts' deference
to arbitral decisions was predicated upon a similar rationale. 132
The U.S. Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence adheres to the ar-
bitral/judicial distinction set forth in the FAA.° Thus, on the one
hand, the Kaplan Court was umvilling to craft judicial procedures
merely to encourage arbitration. 134 On the other hand, under Volt and
Mastrobuono, arbitral procedures are creatures of contract and must be
enforced under the FAA specifically. 135 The heightened-review circuit
split is an outgrowth of this nuanced approach.m The federal circuit
courts of appeals have either upheld heightened-review clauses under
Volt's "hands-off' approach to pro-arbitration policy or implicitly fol-
lowed Kaplan and refused to adopt standards of review that are in-
compatible with the institutional advantages of arbitration."'
II. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT: TRENDING AWAY FROM POLICY AND
TOWARDS JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
Since 1994, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals enforced a
contractual standard of review clause, the courts of appeals have
adopted three modes of analysis to determine whether heightened
standard of review clauses are enforceable under the FAA.'" The Third,
131
 Sec Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383
(1961)).
132 Sec Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 948; sec also Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 n.5 (citing U.S. Supreme
Court labor arbitration precedents for proposition that courts defer to arbitral awards
because parties agree to accept arbitrator's decision).
133 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-5, 9-10 (2000). Compare, e.g., Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942 (concluding
that limited standards of judicial review apply to review of awards), with Iblt, 468 U.S. at 474-
75, 476, 479 (holding that courts must enforce parties' arbitral procedures under FAA).
134 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 948.
133 See Masbobtiono, 514 U.S. at 57-58; l'o/t, 468 U.S. at 479.
138 Compare, e.g„ Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 987, 1000 (drawing distinction between judicial
and arbitral procedures similar to distinction in Kaplan), with Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v.
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2001) (ignoring any arbitral/judicial distinction and
citing Ito': and Mastmbtiono for proposition that, under FAA, courts must enforce arbitra-
tion agreements according to their terms).
137
 Compare, e.g., Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (reasoning that standard of review should be
crafted to maintain arbitration's effectiveness), with Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Tele-
comms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that parties' Contract gov-
erns judicial review of award regardless of effect on institutional advantages of arbitration).
138 Scc Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. City Transit Audi., 14 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir.
1994); see also Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998-1000
(9th Cir. 2003) (describing circuit split). In 1994, in Westinghouse, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the enforcement of a decreased standard of review clause. See 14 F.3d at
821-22. Nevertheless, several prominent commentators have cited the decision for the
proposition that heightened-review clauses are enforceable under the FAA. See, e.g.,
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Fourth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the FAA's
pro-arbitration policy requires enforcement.'" Like these courts, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has reasoned that. pro-arbitration policy
furnishes the analytical framework applicable to heightened-review
clauses, however, it refused enforcement because heightened-review
clauses are detrimental to the continued viability of arbitration. 140 Al-
though the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning persuasive and has expressed serious doubt about the pro-
priety of heightened-review clauses, it has nonetheless declined to ad-
dress the issue until it is presented with an explicit intent to contract
for heightened review."' In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that pro-arbitration policy requires preserving arbitral
finality, but concluded that heightened-review clauses are foreclosed
under the FAA's text and Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 142 Fi-
nally, in a recent development, the Second Circuit. Court of Appeals'
reasoning in 2003, Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., suggests that. the extraor-
dinary circumstances test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1994,
in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, could furnish
the standard for analyzing the enforceability of heightened standard
of review clauses. 113
EiuoNusoN, supra note 2, § 39:15 n.l. The Second Circuit appears to have overruled 'West-
inghouse. See Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2003).
' 39 Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2001); Gateway
Teals., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995); Syncor
Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11. 1997) (unpub-
lished per curiam opinion).
14° See Bowen sr, Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2001).
141 Sec Schoch v. Infousa, Inc. 341 F.3d 785, 789 & 11.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting MC
Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998)), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 1414 (2004).
142 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994, 998. In 1991, in Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago
Sun-Times, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion, albeit in the
labor arbitration context. See 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991). In Chicago 7)pographi-
cal, the appellant argued that an arbitral award should be vacated because the arbitrator
misinterpreted the contract. Id. at 1503. The court concluded that an arbitration agreement
could not grant federal courts the authority to review an arbitrator's decision substantively.
See id. at 1504. Although the court did not consider the propriety of heightened-review
clauses, several courts and commentators have cited Chicago Typographical for the proposi-
tion that heightened-review clauses are invalid in the Seventh Circuit, because the court
stated, "parties ... can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's
award.... but they cannot contract for judicial review of that award ... ." Id. at 1505 (em-
phasis added); see, e.g., Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 999; Cole, supra note 8, at 1244-45.
143 See Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64-66 (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26, 29 (1994)).
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A. Judicial Review as a Matter of Contract: Pro-Heightened-Review Courts'
Default Analysis of the FAA
In 1995, in Gateway Technologies, Inc. V. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., the Fifth Circuit enforced a heightened-review clause that re-
quired a district court to conduct legal error review. 144 The Fifth Cir-
cuit held that heightened review was proper in this instance because
the parties had contracted explicitly for a more searching judicial in-
quiry."8 The court reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings
in 1989 and 1995, in Bolt Information Systems v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University and Mastrobuono Ti. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., respectively, supported its conchtsion." 8 In these cases, the Court
held that the FAA's provisions did not preempt procedural rules that
parties incorporated in arbitration agreements."7 Thus, by analogy,
the Fifth Circuit held that contractual intent required enforcement." 8
In 2001, in Hughes Training Co. v. Cook, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed
the validity of Gateway and clarified the contours of its heightened-
review jurisprudence."9 The arbitration agreement in Cook required a
federal court to review an award de novo.'" The court concluded that
parties could expand judicial review of an arbitration award because
vacatur review was an arbitral procedure, which pursuant to the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA's pro-arbitration policy,
could be structured to meet parties' needs. 15 '
In 2004, in Action Industries, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co., the Fifth Circuit again clarified the underpinnings of its
pro-heightened-review jurisprudence.' 82 The agreement at issue con-
tained a Tennessee choice of law clause, which provided for a circum-
spect legal review.'" The court held the clause was invalid because it
did not express a clear intent to opt out of the FAA's default vacatur
144 64 F.3c1 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995).
143 Id. at 996-97.
148 See id. 996, 997 & n.3.
147 See id. at 996.
148 See id. at 996-97.
146 Sec 254 F.3d 588, 592-93 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Gateway, 64 F.3(1 at 997); see also
Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 496 (5th Cir. 2004) (reaffirming that
Gateway stands for the proposition that parties may alter FAA's default standard of vacatur
review because arbitration is "a creature of contract"); Harris v. Parker College of Chiro-
pratic, 286 F.3d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (same).
150 Sec Cook, 254 F.3d at 590, 594.
131 See id. at 592-593.
132 Sec 358 F.3d 337, 341 n.10 (5th Cir. 2004).
163 Id. at 340 u.9.
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rules. 154 In a footnote, however, the Fifth Circuit also summarily rea-
soned that Mastrobuono overruled the primacy of the FAA's vacatur
standards. 155 In analyzing Mastrobuono, the court stated that the
agreement at issue in that case concerned arbitral procedures; how-
ever, it read Mastrobuono to stand for the proposition that FAA rules
apply to judicial proceedings absent the parties' clear intent to aug-
ment them. 156
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a similar analysis, in
2001, in Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayse0 57 Roadway centered on
the interpretation of a generic choice of law clause, which required a
court to apply Pennsylvania's vacatur rules to an award. 158 The Third
Circuit held that parties could opt out of the FAA's default vacatur
standards. 159 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Roadway court relied on Volt
and Mastrobuono's interpretation of the FAA's pro-arbitration policy
and concluded that vacatur review was an arbitral procedure that par-
ties could alter contractually.too
Nevertheless, because private alteration of a statutory standard of
review was essentially unprecedented, considerations of fairness com-
pelled the Third Circuit to require express intent before finding that
parties opted out of the FAA's default regime. 161 The court considered
an express intent rule salutary because of its easy applicability and
minimal transaction costs. 162 Sophisticated actors who agreed to
heightened review could easily draft an agreement clearly evidenc-
ing such intent, which the courts could then enforce without em-
ploying a detailed statutory and contractual analysis. 163 Accordingly,
the court reasoned that its default rule would increase judicial and
bargaining efficiency. 164
154 Id. at 343.
155 See kl. at 341 & n.10.
156 Sec id. at 341-42, 343.
157 Sec 257 F.3d at 292-93.
'" See id, at 288, 291 n.2.
159 Id. at 288, 293.
16° See id. at 292. The Third Circuit reasoned that under the FAA, courts should en-
force heightened- or decreased-review clauses. See id. at 296.
161 See id. at 294, 296-97 & n.5. The Third Circuit could cite no other federal statute
that set forth default standards of review. Id. at 294.
162 Sec Roadway, 257 F.3d at 297.
10 See id. The Fifth Circuit used the term "sophisticated parties" to refer to parties who
hired lawyers to draft their agreements. Id.
164 See id. at 296, 297.
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B. Proceeding with Caution: The Eighth Circuit's Noncommittal Approach
In 1998, in UHC Management Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences Corp., the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply a heightened-review
clause because the parties did not clearly express an intent to opt out
of the FAA. 166 The agreement stated that the decision of the arbitrator
was final and binding and the court interpreted this statement to fore-
close subsequent substantive judicial review. 166 In dicta, the Eighth Cir-
cuit took issue with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Vat and Mastro-
Imono. 167
 The court opined that it was curious for three reasons to
undertake a searching judicial inquiry when arbitration was contena-
plated. 168 First, the text of the FAA explicitly required confirmation,
unless an award was vacated under section 10. 169 Second, because the
parties voluntarily agreed to arbitrate under the FAA, they essentially
assumed the risk of forgoing a more searching judicial review. 179
the parties could have contracted for an arbitral appellate panel and
thus, obtained heightened review without resorting to litigation . 171
The Eighth Circuit's skeptical heightened-review jurisprudence
was extended in 2003, in Schoch v. Infousa, Inc. 172 At issue in Schoch was
a clause requiring that an arbitral award accord with applicable law. 1 "
The court found persuasive, but declined to adopt, the view that
heightened-revieW clauses were unenforceable because they trenched
on the institutional integrity of the federal courts and threatened the
viability of arbitration. 174 Effectively, the court reasoned, the parties to
a heightened-review agreement privately altered the FAA and trans-
formed the nature of arbitration and judicial review. 176 Such results
seemed inconsistent with the FAA because arbitration is a private sys-
165 See 148 F.3d at 997.
166 Id. at 998.
167 See id. at 995-98. The Eighth Circuit cited lilt for the proposition that the FAA
granted parties the right to craft arbitral procedures that the federal courts would enforce.
Id. at 997. The court was unwilling to conclude that this right was coextensive with the
authority to alter judicial review contractually, especially "when Congress has ordained a
specific, self-limiting procedure for how such a review is to occur." Id.
168 Id. at 997-98.
10 See id. at 997.
170 Sec UHC, 148 F.3d at 998.
171 See id. at 997-98 (quoting LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891
(9th Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., dissenting)).
' 72 Sec 341 F.3d at 789 & 0.3.
173 Id. at 787-88.
174 Sec id. at 789n.3.
1 m Id.
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tern of justice designed to eliminate the cost and delay of litigation."°
The court suggested that the benefits of arbitration could only be
maintained through a restrictive standard of review because otherwise,
arbitration would become a mere preliminary step toward litigation.'"
C. A Dualist Approach to Rejecting Heightened-Review Clauses
1. The Tenth Circuit's Pro-Arbitration Policy Approach
Despite the grave skepticism of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the heightened-review circuit split first manifested in 2001,
when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co. 178 In Bowen, the parties agreed that a court could vacate
an award if it lacked evidentiary support. 179 The Tenth Circuit ac-
knowledged both that the FAA's pro-arbitration policy was well set-
tled and that there was no clear authority allowing heightened re-
view. 18° Accordingly, the court held that the enforceability of
heightened-review clauses turned on whether such practice encour-
aged the final and binding arbitration protected under the FAA. 181
The court then concluded that pro-arbitration policy was only coex-
tensive with private ordering of arbitral proceedings, which the FAA
defined in opposition to judicial procedures. 22 Indeed, the court rea-
soned that the efficacy of arbitration required a strict separation of
arbitration and adjudication. 183
The court offered four reasons supporting this view. 184 First, in
contradiction to the FAA's purpose, heightened-review clauses tend to
erode judicial respect for arbitration.' The judiciary should defer to
the arbitral procedure, but that process was complete when parties
resorted to the federal courts; allowing judicial intermeddling at that
176 See id. (citing Eger Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.
1994)).
177 See Schoch, 341 F.3(1 at 789 n.3 (citing Eljer, 14 F.3d at 1254).
178 Sec 254 F.3d at 936.
176 Id. at 930.
180 See id. at 933-34.
181 See id. at 934. The Bowen court stated, the contractual nature of arbitration is,
therefore, well established.... And our decision today must further the FAA's primary
policy ensuring judicial enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate." Id,
182 Sec id. at 935.
189 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
184 See id. at 935-36.
'ffi See id. at 935.
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late point would eviscerate the utility of litigation avoidance.'' 3° Sec-
ond, the structure of the statutory text codified the distinction be-
tween arbitral and judicial procedures.' 87
 For example, under section
4, federal courts are required to compel arbitration in accordance
with the parties' agreement, but under sections 9 and 10 an award
must be confirmed or vacated under a statutory procedure. 188
 Third,
the court reasoned that the federal courts were ill equipped to judge
the propriety of arbitrations, which are often conducted by industry
experts acting pursuant to a myriad of rules that do not conform to
legal norms. 189
 Finally, this was a fair result because arbitrants could
contract for an arbitral appellate panel.'"
2. Beyond Pro-Arbitration Policy: The Ninth Circuit's Textualist.
Approach
In 2003, in Kyocera Col). v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services Co., the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, adopted the Tenth Cir-
cuit's policy rationales, but held that enforcement of heightened-review
clauses was unconstitutional. 191
 At issue in Kyocera was an arbitration
agreement mandating substantial evidence and de novo review. 192
 Be-
cause the U.S. Constitution grants Congress plenary power to deter-
mine federal judicial procedures, the Ninth Circuit held that height-
ened-review clauses were invalid.'" Unlike the Bowen court, the Ninth
Circuit's holding relied solely on Congress's jurisdictional authority;
because the FAA's narrow vacatur review was clear and explicit, en-
forcement of heightened-review clauses was an unconstitutional usur-
pation of Congress's constitutional prerogative. 194
Like the Tenth Circuit, however, the Kyocera court reasoned that
other policy considerations militated strongly against enforcing
196 See id. In a footnote, the court also reasoned that heightened-review clauses would
tend to increase the costs of arbitration itself. Id. at 936 11.7. Because expanded review
would require arbitrators to produce written opinions, the efficiency of arbitration would
be sacrificed. Id. This would transform arbitration from a litigation alternative to "yet an-
other step on the ladder of litigation." Id.
167
 See id. at 935.
188
 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 4,10-11 (2000)).
' 60
 See id. at 935-36.
19°
 See id. at 936-37 (citing UHC, 148 F.3d at 997-98; Chi. Typogruphica4 935 F.2d at
1504-05).
191
 Sec 341 F.3d at 994,998,1000.
192 See id. at 990-91.
199 See id. at 994.
1" See id. at 994,1000.
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heightened-review clauses. 195 The Kyocera court interpreted the FAA as
allowing parties to trade the costs associated with the federal courts'
circumspect legal decisions for an arbitral determination. 1" Thus,
because expanded judicial review would require increased delay and
formality, the propagation of heightened-review clauses would tend to
erode the benefits of arbitration. 197 If parties desired this result, they
could contract for an arbitral appellate pane1, 198 Finally, the court rea-
soned that even if the FAA's vacatur standard was ambiguous, it was
well settled that only courts may interpret statutory text to develop
appropriate standards of review.'"
D. Recent Development: The Second Circuit Holds that Judicial Standards of
Review Are Not the Property of Private Litigants
In 2003, in Hoeft, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
arbitrants could not contract for decreased judicial review of an
award. 2" The agreement at issue in Hoeft provided that arbitral awards
were final and binding and not subject to judicial review. 201 The Sec-
ond Circuit reasoned that the FAA's vacatur standards represent a
safety net that undergirds the Act's pro-arbitration policy. 202 Courts
are required to defer to arbitral agreements because they retain a lim-
ited vacatur authority, which prevents courts from sanctioning unjust
arbitral proceedings. 203 In response to the appellant's claim that non-
statutory vacatur standards could be contractually precluded because,
as a common-law rule, they were entitled to less protection than the
FAA's vacantr grounds, the court cited Bowen for die proposition that.
arbitrants may not interfere with judicial processes by contract. 204
In addition, the court supported its conclusion with U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent. 205 Relying on the Court's decision in 1994, in
Bonner Mall, the Second Circuit held that standards of review, like ju-
dicial precedents, are not the property of private litigants. 20° Thus,
195 See id. at 998.
' 96 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998.
197 Sec id.
198 Id. at 1000.
199 Id.
200 Sec 343 F.3d at 65.
2°1 Id. at 60.
202 Sec id. at 63, 64,
2" See id,
2U4 Sec id. at 65 (citing Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 n.8).
205 Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 65.
206 Sec id. (citing Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 29).
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even though the manifest disregard of the law standard was created
judicially, it could not be preempted by contract. 2°7 Rather, arbitrants
take arbitration law as they find it, complete with the FAA and com-
mon-law vacatur standards. 2" Although arbitrants may customize their
private proceedings, they may not override statutory or judicial
authority.20 This is because courts, unlike arbitrators, are authorized
to review arbitral awards pursuant to statute, not contract. 210 There-
fore, the court implied that contractually mandated decreased review
compromises courts' institutional integrity. 2"
E. Previous Scholarly Attempts at an Analytical Framework
The variant approaches—contractual, intentionalist, and textu-
alist—that courts have applied to determine the validity of height-
ened-review clauses prompted two attempts to develop a uniform ana-
lytical framework. 212 To resolve the circuit split, the "managerial
litigation model" and the "arbitral appellate model" attempt to en-
force heightened-review clauses under a consistent rubric to ensure
the preservation of judicial integrity.2"
Under the managerial litigation model, a court would only ac-
quiesce to parties' heightened-review requests provided that the par-
ties' agreement did not require courts to make arbitrary and capri-
cious decisions, 2 " Accordingly, the model suggests a two-prong test
requiring enforcement if there is both (1) a sufficient arbitral record,
and (2) a contractual standard of review, such as legal error review,
207 See id. at 64-65.
208
 See hi. at 65-66.
209 See id.
210 Sec Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 65-66.
211 See id. at 64, 65, 66. The Second Circuit also distinguished Katz v. Feinberg, in which
it allowed the parties to preclude arbitral review of an arbitration award. Id. at 65-66 (cit-
ing Katz v. Feinberg, 290 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2002)). The court held that there was no
contradiction between precluding arbitral review of an award and disallowing equivalent
preclusion of judicial review. Id. at 66. Although arbitration is a creature of contract, fully
malleable by the parties, judicial authority to review an arbitration award derives from
statutory, not private, authority. Id.
212 SCC Cole, supra note 8, at 1203, 1205-06; van Ginkel, supra note 8, at 188-92.
213 Compare Cole, supra note 8, at 1259-60, 1263 (arguing that managerial litigation
model prevents judiciary from making arbitrary and capricious decisions), with van Ginkel,
supra note 8, at 197-98 (arguing that proper distinction between arbitral appeal and vaca-
tur allows courts to enforce heightened-review clauses under U.S. Supreme Court's FAA
jurisprudence).
214 Sec Cole, supra note 8, at 1259, 1260.
2004]	 APIalyzi rig Heightened Review Clauses 	 969
that would not compromise the court's integrity. 219 Adherents to this
view argue that it encourages party autonomy and more efficacious
dispute resolution without sacrificing judicial integrity. 216 Proponents
also point out that the vacatur-by-settlement procedure at issue in the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1994 decision, in Bonner Mall, is similar to
heightened-review clauses because both requests implicate judicial
integrity concerns. 217 Nevertheless, these scholars reason that Bonner
Malts analysis is likely inapposite to the current debate because en-
forcing heightened-review clauses does not implicate the Court's con-
cerns with collateral attacks and the devaluation of precedent. 218
The arbitral appellate model presumes that constitutional and
textual concerns are not implicated in a heightened-review request
because section 10 of the FAA codifies vacant,. standards. 219 Vacatur
review is an extremely narrow inquiry, which assumes that parties have
agreed to arbitrate their dispute in one final instance. 220 In the
heightened-review context, however, the parties disclaim arbitral
finality and voluntarily contract for a more accurate, albeit less
efficient, result. 221 Thus, once courts are freed from conflating vacatur
review with the appellate review requested under a heightened-review
clause, enforcement is purely a policy decision. 222 Therefore, because
the FAA's pro-arbitration policy requires the promotion of party
autonomy through specific enforcement of arbitration agreements,
the FAA requires enforcement of heightened-review clauses. 223
These previous attempts to formulate a uniform standard of re-
view illustrate the importance of balancing pro-arbitration policy with
judicial integrity. 224 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court also recognized,
in Bonner Mall, that alternative dispute resolution methods mandating
perfunctory judicial enforcement pose a threat to judicial integrity. 225
The Court's approach to this dilemma is the extraordinary circum-
213 See id. at 1263. An example of a standard of review that would compromise institu-
tional integrity is the "flip [ping] of a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl ...." Id.
216 Id.
217 See id. at 1216-17.
216 Scc id. at 1216.
219 &cyan Ginkel, supra note 8, at 188,192.
229 Sec id.
221 See id. at 212-13.
222 Id. at 192.
225 Id. at 194,197-98.
224 Sec Cole, supra note 8, at 1259; van Ginkel, supra note 8, at 198.
225 Sec BOti Pier Mall, 513 U.S. at 26-29; sec also Cole, supra note 8, at 1216 (reasoning
that vacatur by contract implicates courts' concern with maintaining finality of litigation
and value of precedent).
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stances test. 226 In contrast to the managerial litigation model, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals has not limited Bonner Mall to its facts. 227
Instead, in Hoeft, the court employed Bonner Malts reasoning to defeat
a decreased standard of review clause. 228 Given the importance of a
proper interpretation of U.S. Supreme Court precedent to the
heightened-review dilemma, the question arises whether the Second
Circuit's interpretation was correct. 229
M. BONNER MALL AND ITS FORERUNNER IN THE ARBITRAL CONTEXT
In 1994, in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a settlement agreement, standing
alone, could not justify vacating precedent. 2" While the case was
pending before the Court, the parties in Bonner Mall agreed to settle
and stipulated that the settlement mooted the case. 231 In the interim,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed a "new value excep-
226 See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26-29.
227 Sec Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 65. But see Cole, supra note 8, at 1216 n.88 (suggesting that
Bonner Mall's rationale with respect to mutual vacatur requests was dicta).
228 Sec Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 65.
229 Cf. Schmitz, supra note 51, at 197-98 (arguing that variant interpretations of U.S.
Supreme Court precedent have perpetuated heightened-review circuit split). In Hoeft, the
Second Circuit implied, in dicta, that its Bonner hall analysis might not be applicable to
heightened-review clauses, which posed different concerns than a clause that eliminates
any judicial review of an award. 343 F.3d at 64. The Second Circuit did not elaborate on
this suggestion; however, these reservations seem akin to equitable concerns raised by
pro-heightened-review courts, which conclude that contractual fairness should compel
courts to enforce arbitral agreements that contemplate heightened-review. Compare, e.g., id.
(implying that agreement requiring heightened-review might not offend judicial integrity
because it would not force court to act as rubber stamp), with Hughes, 254 F.3d at 594 (rea-
soning that heightened-review clause is an equitable procedure because it is fully available
to both parties). Notably, just five clays before Hoeft was decided, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Kyocera, implied, in dicta, that decreased-review clauses were less threatening to
Congress's plenary procedural authority than heightened-review clauses. See Kyocera, 341
F.3d at 998-99 n.16.
The Second and Ninth Circuits' variant reasoning suggests a divergence on the issue
of arbitral finality. See Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64, 65; Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998. The Kyocera court
apparently views the FAA as a structure that preserves arbitral finality to ensure arbitra-
tion's viability, as a litigation alternative, for the entire legal community. See 341 F.3d at 998.
Conversely, the Second Circuit suggests that the FAA only protects finality to the extent
that it is desired by particular arbitrants. See Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64,65. For a fuller discussion
of this distinction and its implication on the applicability of Bonner Malts extraordinary
circumstances test to the heightened-review circuit split, see infra notes 281-292 and ac-
companying text.
23° See 513 U.S. 18,26-28,29 (1994).
m Id. at 20.
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Lion" to the Bankruptcy Code's absolute priority rule. 232 Because the
settlement agreement foreclosed the Court's review of the exception,
the petitioner argued that. the Ninth Circuit's judgment should be
vacated. 233 A unanimous Court decided to apply the "extraordinary
circumstances test" to contractual vacatur requests. 234 The test was
crafted in accordance with the exceptional remedy of vacatur, which
not only allows for future relitigation, but also abrogates precedent. 233
The standard required courts to balance (1) the parties' relative fault
in causing the case to become moot, and (2) the public interest in
judicial integrity.236
Turning to the first prong of the test, the Court held that when a
party voluntarily enters a settlement agreement with the foreknowl-
edge that the agreement will render a judgment unreviewable, such
party is at fault for causing mootness, 237 Although this complicity
placed a heavy burden on the petitioner, it could be overcome if vaca-
tur was in the public interest. 238 The Court reasoned that vacatur by
settlement implicated the public's interest in maintaining judicial in-
tegrity.239 Because the entire legal community relies on precedent and
orderly judicial procedure in structuring its affairs, the Court was un-
willing to grant private litigants a property right in precedent. 24° The
Court implied that it would be implausible to uphold vacatur by con-
tract on fairness grounds because the parties to a settlement agree-
ment. could have forgone settlement and obtained thorough judicial
review."' Finally, the Court. extended its holding to settlement agree-
232 Id. at 20 SC 11.I.
233 See id. at 26.
234 See id. 26-27, 29. The Court stated that vacatur was an "extraordinary remedy" that
required an analysis of the parties' fault in causing moonless and the public interest in
main tabling judicial integrity. Sec id. at 26-27.
233 Sec Bonner Matt, 513 U.S. at 22-23, 26 (citing United States v. Musingwear, Inc., 340
U.S. 36, 40 (1950)).
238 See id. at 26-27. The Court also analyzed the claim that contractual vacantr would
advance the public's interest in fostering judicial economy through settlement. Id. at 27-
28. The Court implied that this policy justification was outside the rubric of the extraordi-
nary circumstances test because, absent an empirical lest, it was impossible to determine
whether a contractual vacatur rule would serve to preclude litigation. Sec id. Indeed, the
Court opined that the ready availability of contractual vacatur relief could deter settlement
at the district court level. Id. at 28.
2" Id. at 25-26.
2" See id. at 26.
239 Id.
24° See Bonner Afall, 513 U.S. at 26.
241 See id. at 25, 27.
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mews that expressly required vacatur. 242 Because this factual distinc-
tion would not change the voluntary character of the settlement or
vacatur's affect on judicial integrity, it would not qualify as an extraor-
dinary circumstance . 243
Although Bonner Mall's "extraordinary circumstances test" applies
explicitly to vacating precedent, at least two federal circuit courts of
appeals have employed a similar analysis when considering motions to
vacate confirmed arbitral awards .244 In 1983, in Merit Insurance Co. v.
Leathern Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
equitable vacatur of a confirmed award required not only a showing
that an arbitrator had breached ethical guidelines, which were incor-
porated by reference in the arbitration agreement, but that this
breach created the substantial danger that a court would confirm an
unjust result. 245 The parties in Merit agreed to arbitrate pursuant to
the rules of the American Arbitration Association (the "AAA"). 246 Ac-
cordingly, the prospective arbitrators were required to disclose any
relationships that might affect their impartiality. 247 One month after
the arbitration award was confirmed and eighteen months after it was
rendered, the appellee uncovered evidence that an arbitrator had a
prior professional relationship with appellant's president. 248 Based on
these facts, the district court vacated its decision confirming the award
under Rule 60(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allows a final judgment to be vacated "for any reason justifying relief
from the judgment."249 On review, the Seventh Circuit considered
(1) the relative fault of the parties, (2) the purposes of the FAA, and
(3) the public interest in protecting the finality of arbitration. 250
2" Sec id. at 29.
243
	 id.
244 See LaFarge Conseils et Etudes. S.A. v Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d
1334, 1338, 1339 & n.12 (9111 Cir. 1986); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co„ 714 F.2d 673,
682-83 (7th Cir. 1983). In LaFarge, the appellant moved to vacate a confirmed arbitral
award pursuant to Rule 60(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a
final judgment to be vacated in the interests of justice. 791 F.2d at 1338. The appellant
argued that the district court's refusal to consider evidence of arbitral fraud, which was
uncovered after the confirmation, entitled it to relief. Id. at 1338, 1339. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that such relief was only warranted in extraordinary circum-
stances, which did not include fraud or newly discovered evidence. Sec id.
246 714 F.2d at 682-83.
246 Id. at 676.
247 Id. at 678.
246 Id, at 677.
2" Id. at 676, 682.
266 Sec Moil, 714 F.2d at 682-83.
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First, the court emphasized that the decision to arbitrate was vol-
untary.251 The appellant's uncoerced choice to authorize a panel of
industry experts to decide the merits of its claim was coextensive with
a commitment to forgo judicial resolution.252 The court noted that the
parties chose to arbitrate before experts because they were familiar
with industry norms; however, because experts are also more likely to
be biased than a federal judge, this choice entailed a tradeoff between
impartiality and expertise. 253 Therefore, because the appellant freely
accepted the arbitral bargain, it assumed the risk of arbitral bias. 254
The Merit court next considered whether the arbitrator's viola-
tion of the contract's ethical guidelines required vacatur under sec-
tion 10 of the FAA. 255 The court concluded that, standing alone, these
rules did not require the federal courts to do anything because they
did not have the force of law. 255 Indeed, the purposes of the rules and
FAA vacatur standards were diametrically opposed. 257 The AAA
adopted ethical standards to attract customers with a particular form
of alternative dispute resolution, 258 Conversely, the court reasoned
that Congress intended the FAA's vacatur standards to make arbitra-
tion effective not attractive.259 The FAA accomplished this purpose
through the federal court's coercive confirmation authority, which
gives arbitration awards the force of law. 26° Parties are encouraged to
arbitrate because judicial intervention under the FAA ensures the ba-
sic fairness of the arbitral process without excessive judicial med-
dling. 261 Nevertheless, encouraging arbitration was not coextensive
with lowering the threshold for judicial review of awards in accor-
dance with parties' arbitral procedures; thus, a party could obtain va-
catur of an award only if it could bring itself within the FAA or some
other federal rule. 252
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had
abused its discretion in equitably vacating the award pursuant to Fed-




233 lifer*, 714 F.2d at 680-81.
236 Id.
267 See id. at 681.
238 Id.
239 See id.
263 See Merit, 714 F.24 at 681.
261 See id.
262 See id.
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eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (6). 265
 Focusing on the lapse of
eighteen months since the arbitral award was rendered, the court
noted that equitable vacatur was an extraordinary remedy because it
undermined society's interest in finality. 264
 Even if the arbitrator vio-
lated the AAA's ethical standards, the court reversed the vacatur be-
cause confirmation was not substantially unjust. 265
 The court con-
chided that the appellant implicitly agreed to accept the decision of
the arbitrator because it made no inquiries concerning impartiality
before arbitrating a $10 million dispute. 266
 Thus, the court reasoned
that the vacatur motion was merely a tactical response to a poor arbi-
tral outcome.267
 To affirm vacatur in these circumstances would only
serve to undermine the finality of arbitration because it would en-
courage all disappointed arbitrants to engage in expensive collateral
attacks. 268
 This, in turn, would undermine the FAA's purpose of mak-
ing arbitration an effective alternative to judicial dispute resolution. 269
Finally, the court found the appellant's request wholly inequitable be-
cause it would permit parties to require courts, which could have re-
solved their dispute in the first instance, to undo the results of a vol-
untary decision 10 opt out of litigation. 270
N. ANALYSIS: HISTORY, TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND PRECEDENT SUPPORT
APPLICATION OF BONNER MALL'S EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES
TEST TO HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF REVIEW CLAUSES
The federal circuit courts of appeals continue to struggle over
whether to enforce heightened standard of review clauses in arbitral
agreements. 27 ' Prior judicial attempts to articulate a coherent, uni-
form analytical framework applicable to heightened-review clauses are
unlikely to foster a consensus either because they are based upon a
close reading of ambiguous statutory text or an interpretation of an
265
 See id. at 676, 683.
264
 See id. at 682.
265 Sec Mei*, 714 F.2d at 682-83.
266




276 Merit, 714 F.2d at 683.
271 Conipmc, e.g., Action Indus., Inc. V. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340-
41 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that U.S. Supreme Court precedents require enforce-
ment of heightened-review clauses), with Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs.,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that enforcement is unconstitutional).
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amorphous pro-arbitration polic): 272 As several courts and commenta-
tors have noted, any successful uniform analytical framework must
maintain an adequate balance between the FAA's preference for pri-
vate ordering and judicial integrity. 273 Accordingly, because the U.S.
Supreme Court, in 1994, in U.S. BanCOIP Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership, established an analytical framework for evaluating parties'
contractual requests for judicial action, this Part. proposes that federal
courts apply Bonner Man extraordinary circumstances test when de-
termining whether to enforce heightened-review clauses. 274 The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals anticipated this Part's proposal and ap-
plied a test similar to the extraordinary circumstances test in 1983, in
Merit Insurance Co. v. Leathcrby Insurance Co., to reject a vacatur request
predicated upon an arbitrator's violation of an arbitration agree-
ment's procedural rules. 275
To establish Bonner Mall's applicability to the heightened-review
circuit split, Part IV.A analyzes the pro- and anti-heightened-review con-
ceptions of arbitral finality and contends that the pro-heightened-review
position is incompatible with the history of arbitral awards, the FAA's
text, structure, legislative history, and the precedents interpreting
the FAA, because enforcing heightened-review clauses weakens the
viability of arbitration as a mode of alternative dispute resolution
available to the entire legal community. 27° Building upon Part IV.A's
statutory and case law analysis, Part IV.B argues that Bonner Mall's ex-
traordinary circumstances test should apply to heightened-review liti-
gants' vacatur requests because such requests are functionally analo-
gous to the attempt to vacate unfavorable precedent pursuant to a
settlement agreement. 277 Next, Part IV.0 anticipates the contention
that applying Bonner Mall's extraordinary circumstances lest to height-
ened-review vacatur requests is incompatible with pro-arbitration pol-
272 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 8, at 1258.
272 See, e.g., Schoch v. Infousa, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 & 11.3 (8th Cir. 2003); Cole, supra
note 8, at 1259; Goldman, supra note 8, at 185-86; van Ginkel, supra note 8, at 198.
274 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26-27, 29
(1994); sec also Hoeft v. MVI, Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64, 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
under Bonner Mall, parties could not contract for decreased review of arbitral award, but
reasoning that Banner Malts holding might be inapposite in the beightened-review context);
Cole, supra note 8, at 1216-17, 1259-60 (reasoning that concerns of devaluation of prece-
dent and collateral attack are not readily present in the arbitral context and thus, because
parties are merely asking court to apply standards of review, court could grant request
without compromising institutional integrity).
276 See 714 F.2d 673, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1983).
276 See infra notes 281-324 and accompanying text.
277  See infra notes 325-342 and ;Accompanying text.
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icy because it contravenes the express terms of arbitration agree-
ments.278
 In response, this Part concludes that the extraordinary cir-
cumstances test conforms to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
1995, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan because it protects arbi-
tration's primary institutional advantage—finality—and because arbi-
tration's inherent flexibility necessitates the conclusion than any ineq-
uity under Banner Malls analytical rubric is attributable solely to the
fault of the contracting parties. 279
 Finally, Part IV.D summarizes the
foregoing analysis. 28°
A. The Extraordinary Circumstances Test Ensures the Preservation of the
Final and Binding Arbitration that the FAA Was Intended to Protect
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' suggestion in 2003, in Hoeft
v. MVL Group, Inc., that Bonner Mall's extraordinary circumstances
might be inapplicable to heightened-review clauses is flawed. 284
 With-
out further analysis, the court explained that there was a qualitative
difference between arbitration agreements that narrowed judicial re-
view and those that expanded judicial review. 282
 Notably, just five days
before Hoeft was decided, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kyo-
cera Cop. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services Co., registered implicit dis-
agreement with the Second Circuit's distinction. 283 The Kyocera court
explained that if the FAA was silent on parties' ability to obtain con-
tractual review, it might be less pernicious for courts to enforce a de-
creased-review clause. 284
The Second and Ninth Circuit's positions highlight the impor-
tance of finality in the heightened-review debate. 285 The Second Cir-
cuit seems unwilling to foreclose the validity of heightened-review
clauses because courts could employ the clauses to render a particular
equitable result, without abdicating their duty to review arbitral
awards. 286
 This is precisely the position of pro-heightened-review ju-
risprudence, which holds that it is inequitable to preclude heightened
review if the parties have grafted it onto their arbitral process to en-
278 See infra notes 344-347 and accompanying text.
278 See infra notes 348-363 and accompanying text.
288 See infra notes 364-379 and accompanying text.
281 See Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64,65. For a fuller review of this statement, see supra note 229.
282 Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64.
283
 Sec Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998-99 n.16.
284 Id.
20 Sec Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64; Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998.
288 See Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64.
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sure a legally or factually accurate result. 287 Indeed, in 2001, in Road-
way Package System, Inc. v. Kayser;' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
enforced a heightened-review clause to ensure that it would not frus-
trate the parties' nmtual request for a more circumspect legal analy-
sis. 288 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, like other anti-heightened-review
courts, was unconcerned with doing justice to particular arbitrants,
and it reasoned that any benefit gained from particular equitable re-
sults would be vastly outweighed , by diminished judicial integrity and
the evisceration of arbitral finality. 289 Similarly, in 2001, in Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to en-
force a heightened-review clause because expanded judicial review
threatened to undermine the finality of arbitral awards and, concomi-
tantly, the viability of arbitration. 29° Like the Kyocera. and Bowen courts,
in Merit, the Seventh Circuit held that the FAA granted courts the
authority to make arbitration an effective litigation alternative through
award enforcement, but that the Act's pro-arbitration policy was not
coextensive with an assurance that parties could contractually conscript
courts to void a poor arbitral result.291 Because the FAA's history; text,
structure, legislative history, and precedent strongly support anti-
heightened-review courts' preference for arbitral viability as opposed to
pro-heightened-review courts' protection of party autonomy; the Sec-
ond Circuit's suggestion that Bonner Malt s extraordinary circumstances
is inapplicable to heightened-review clauses is of no moment. 292
1. History, Text, Structure, Legislative History, and Precedent Support
the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits' Finality Analysis
The FAA's text, structure, legislative history, and the precedents
interpreting the FAA, illustrate that the anti-heightened-review courts'
finality analysis was correct. 293 After the U.S. Supreme Court decided
287 See, e.g., Hughes Training Co. v. Conk, 254 F.3d 588, 593, 594 (5th Cir. 2001); Gate-
way Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995).
288 See 257 F.3d 287, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2001); sec also Action Indus., 358 F.3d at 340-41 (rea-
soning that consensual nature of arbitration mandates enforcement of heightened-review
clauses).
lw See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998, 1000.
290 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001).
291 See Merit, 714 F.2d at 681, 683.
29'2 See Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64; Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998; BOTIlen, 254 F.3d at 935; Merit, 714
F.2d at 681, 683.
293 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-5, 9-10 (2000); SOuthland Corp, v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984);
Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854); MACNEIL, SUP/ note 51, at 33;
MACNEIL ET AL, supra note 14, §§ 8.1, 9.3 n.16.
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Burch& v. Marsh in 1854, it was well settled that courts would best en-
courage arbitration if they considered awards as final judgments and
reviewed final awards narrowly for egregious procedural irregulari-
ties. 294
 Like the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the Borchelt Court
was not concerned with doing justice to particular arbitrants; indeed,
the Court refused to review an award for legal error because it be-
lieved that the practice could lead only to increased litigation, which
would discourage future parties from resorting to arbitration.295
As the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested, the text and structure
of the FAA ensure the viability of arbitration by limiting judicial in-
termeddling in the arbitral process. 296
 Sections 2 through 5 of the
FAA assure parties that the courts will enforce their arbitral proce-
dures. 297
 Once those procedures have rendered a final award, how-
ever, sections 9 and 10 mandate that the award will be set aside only
because of egregious procedural defects in the arbitral process. 298
 Ac-
cordingly, the FAA's text ensures that parties get what they bargain
for, namely, the decision of an arbitrator after a full and fair hear-
ing. 299
 Because courts have recognized that strict adherence to the text
of sections 9 and 10 of the FAA allows for some particularly egregious
results, they have also crafted extremely narrow non-statutory vacatur
standards."0
 Like their statutory counterparts, however, these non-
294 See Borchelt, 58 U.S. at 349-50; Karthaus v. Mlas y Ferrer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 222, 226-
27, 229 (1828); White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 77 N.E. 327, 335-36 (Ill. 1906); see also
Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121 (1924) (deciding, one year before FAA
enacted, that under Borchelt and Karthaus, federal courts could enforce arbitral awards).
295
 Compare Borchelt, 58 U.S. at 349 (holding that viability of arbitration depended on
limited vacatur grounds), with Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998 (stating that broadening judicial
review of arbitral awards could limit parties' ability to trade more circumspect decision of a
federal court for more efficient arbitral determination), Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (reasoning
that heightened review would dilute finality and thus, undermine the viability of arbitra-
tion), and Merit, 714 F.2d at 683 (holding that expanded vacant• grounds would under-
mine the finality of arbitration and thus, contravene FAA's intent).
299 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942, 943 (1995); This Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland J. Stanford junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474-75 (1989); see
also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1995) (quoting
VW/ and reasoning that under FAA, courts must enforce awards obtained pursuant to rules
set forth in arbitral agreements). But see Action Indus., 358 F.3d at 341 n.10 (deciding that
Mastrobuono stands for the broader proposition that parties may contract around judicial
procedural rules set forth in FAA).
292 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-5.
299 See id. §§ 9-10; Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942.
299 See, e.g., Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942-43.
so° See, e.g., Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 241 (1st Cir. 1995);
Lifecare Intl v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 435 (11th Cir. 1995); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986).
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statutory standards of review ensure that the finality of the arbitral bar-
gain is not jettisoned because of an arbitrator's legal or factual errors." 1
Thus, because neither statutory nor non-statutory standards of review
permit a substantive review of the factual or legal dispositions of the
arbitrator, these strictly limited standards of review prevent judicial in-
terference with arbitral finality in all but extreme circumstances. 302
Limited judicial review under the FAA's enforcement scheme is
not accidental.'" Congress decided to codify the vacatur provisions of
the ABA's Arbitration Statute, which rejected the English and Illinois
arbitration statutes' overlapping division of labor between courts and
arbitrators,s0" Under the English and Illinois statutes, an arbitrator's
legal conclusions were never final because a court, upon motion of
either arbitrant, could overrule them."' The FAA's framers found
such excessive judicial interference inimical to the promotion of arbi-
tration and thus, explicitly codified the ABA statute's narrow vacatur
grounds. 3" The preference for narrow vacatur standards reflects a
desire to distinguish clearly between arbitrators and courts." 7 Con-
gress enacted an enforcement scheme under which arbitrators were
primary decisionmakers and courts were granted coercive authority to
implement final  results of the arbitral bargain and to prevent egre-
gious procedural errors, 3 D8
Finally, even the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in 1989 and
1995, in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stan-
ford Junior University and Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
which pro-heightened-review courts rely heavily upon, implicitly sup-
port the anti-heightened-review courts' finality approach The Vail
Court upheld the enforcement of arbitral procedures under section 4
of the FAA, which contravened the FAA's pro-arbitration policy by
301 See Acivest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990).
902 Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997-98._
303 Sec Schmitz, supra note 51, at 149-50.
904 MACNEIL, sup', note 51, at 31-32, 33, 35; MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 14, §§ 8.1, 9.3
n.16.
30' See NiAcNEtt„ supra note 51, at 33; see also Schmitz, supra note 51, at 150-51 (argu-
ing that FAA drafters crafted section 10 to avoid divesting arbitrators of ultimate decision-
making authority).
306 See MACNEIL, supra note 51, at 33; MAGNEIL. ET AL., Stipa note 14, §§ 8,1, 9.3 n.16.
907 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942-43; Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997-98, 1000; Bowen, 254 F.3d at
935.
368 Sec Merit, 714 F.2d at 681; sec also Schmitz, supra note 51, at 150-51 (arguing that
FAA's framers intended to preserve arbitral finality by sharply distinguishing arbitral and
judicial authority).
900 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57-58; 1lt, 489 U.S. at 476 & n.5; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
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spawning increased litigation, but these procedures were derived from
a state arbitration law that was patently designed to encourage arbitra-
tion.310
 Mastrobuono merely affirms the validity of Volt in the context of
confirming arbitral awards; it holds that when parties' arbitral proce-
dures yield a final award, courts will enforce the results of the arbitral
process. 3" Moreover, in re-affirming Volt, the Masirobuono Court em-
phasized the Volt Court's finding that the arbitral procedures it up-
held were manifestly designed to encourage parties' resort to arbitra-
tion.m Thus, far from confirming the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in
2004, in Action Industries, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
that Mastrobuono implied that parties could contractually alter a fed-
eral court's vacatur analysis under the FAA, a close reading of Mastro-
buono confirms that its holding was limited to enforcing the results of
an arbitral process that did not contravene the FAA's pro-arbitration
policy. 313 Indeed, as the Tenth Circuit reasoned in Bowen, Volt did not
even imply the thoroughly novel proposition that the FAA supports
contracting for judicial review,sl" Therefore, because the Mastrobuono
Court's analysis relied on the fact that the agreement at issue ac-
corded with Volt because its arbitral procedure did not contravene the
FAA's pro-arbitration policy, it seems unlikely the Court would read
Volt to give effect to heightened-review clauses, which seek to mandate
judicial procedures and undermine arbitration's viability through in-
creased litigation 315 Absent an empirical study, it is impossible to de-
termine whether enforcing heightened-review clauses would lead to
increased litigation costs and judicial inefficiency. 316 The facts in Kyo-
cera and Merit, however, suggest that allowing heightened-review liti-
gants to attack final arbitral awards collaterally would lead many dis-
310 See Ibit, 489 U.S. at 476 8:11.5, 479.
311 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58, 64.
312 See id. at 57; lblt, 489 U.S. at 476 & n.5.
313 Compare Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57-58 (limiting colt to requiring enforcement of
arbitral procedures that encourage use of arbitration), with Action Indus., 358 F.3d at 341
11.10 (concluding that Mastrobuono's holding implicitly overrules courts' longstanding prac-
tice of applying FAA's limited vacatur grounds).
'14 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-35.
313 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57-58; Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935;
sec also Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942 (reasoning that under FAA, party relinquishes practical
value of right to judicial review and is only entitled to extremely limited review mandated
by FAA and manifest disregard for the law standard).
318 See Merit, 714 F.2d at 682-83; sec also Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 991-994 (setting forth
lengthy course of litigation arising out of heightened-review clause). But see Cole, supra
note 8, at 1262 (rejecting judicial efficiency argument against heightened-review clauses
absent empirical study).
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appointed arbitrants to attempt to void poor arbitral results through
lengthy litigation. 317
Neither the FAA's history, text, intent, structure, nor its prece-
dent, support pro-heightened-review courts' conclusion that arbitral
finality tinder the FAA is a creature of contract. 318 Indeed, the assump-
tion that arbitral awards are final and binding informs the division of
arbitral and judicial labor under the FAA. 319 Furthermore, the con-
cept of finality thoroughly pervades the Act and is an integral part of
its pro-arbitration policy. 320 Finality undergirds the FAA's promotion
of arbitration in lieu of litigation because without the assurance of
finality, few prospective arbitrants would be willing to waste any re-
sources on an arbitration that was merely a prelude to litigation:32 i
Given these considerations, the Second Circuit's reasoning that.
heightened-review clauses might be acceptable under the FAA is un-
tenable.322 Although the FAA's liberal encouragement of varying arbi-
tral procedures is party centered, its strict. assurance of finality implies
its intent to preserve arbitration as a viable litigation alternative for
the entire legal community. 323 Accordingly, the Second Circuit's pur-
ported distinction between narrow- and heightened-review clauses
should not prevent courts from adopting Bonner Malts extraordinary
circumstances test. 324
B. Bonner Mall 's Compatibility with Arbitral Practice and Its Superiority to
Previous Attempts at a Uniform Standard of Review
The similarity between the factual scenarios present in cases
comprising the heightened-review circuit split and the facts at issue in
317 See Merit, 714 F.2d at 683.
316 Sec Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997-1000; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-37; Cole. supra note 8, at
1258.
31° Sec Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942-43. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (requiring that arbitral
agreements be expressly enforced), with 9 U.S.C. § 10 (mandating particular standards of
review after agreement has yielded arbitral award).
32° Sec Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998; Bowen, 254 F,3d at 935.
s21 Sec. e.g., Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935,936 n.7; Merit, 714 F.2d at 683.
322 Compare Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942 (reasoning that agreement to arbitrate divests court
of authority to decide merits of dispute), Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998 (concluding that FAA
allows parties to opt for final arbitral decisions and not to jeopardize the viability of arbi-
tration with heightened•review clauses), and Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (citing Kaplan and
reasoning that viability of arbitration requires non-enforcement of techniques that tend to
undermine finality of awards), with Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64 (assuming, but not deciding, that
equitable considerations would support enforcement of arbitral awards).
323 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
"4 See Hoeft 343 F.3d at 64.
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Bonner Mall further suggests the applicability of the extraordinary cir-
cumstances test to heightened-review clauses. 325 The parties in Bonner
Mall decided to forgo litigation and settled their dispute privately. 326
After the settlement was final, the petitioner was displeased with the
results of settlement—the continued viability of unfavorable lower
court precedents—and sought to enlist the Court to vacate the unfa-
vorable precedents and thus, to perfect its contractual expectations. 327
Similarly, heightened-review litigants choose to forgo litigation, obtain a
result—an unfavorable arbitration award—that they are unhappy with,
and claim that contractual fairness requires a federal court to conform
its processes to those set forth in a private arbitral agreement. 328
Factually, the scenario in Bonner Mall is distinguishable from the
heightened-review cases because heightened-review litigants ask a
court to apply a standard of review, not to overturn precedent. 32° Nev-
ertheless, this distinction is inconsequential, because as the Second
Circuit reasoned in Hoeft, the standards of review that apply to an ar-
bitration award are as valuable to the legal community as any prece-
dent."° Indeed, ensuring the ability of parties to opt for final arbitra-
tion under the FAA's limited review scheme is like ensuring that they
can rely on precedent when they choose to litigate, because the pres-
ervation of limited review and precedent facilitates expeditious reso-
lution of disputes."' Therefore, courts should extend Bonner Ma ll's
extraordinary circumstances test to the heightened-review context;
Bonner Mall teaches that courts should conform their processes to
contractual requests only after balancing the relative fault of the par-
ties with the public interest in maintaining judicial integrity. 332
Relative fault is high in the heightened-review context. 333 Like all
FAA litigants, heightened-review litigants knowingly forgo the circum-
spect legal and factual analyses of the federal courts, and their atten-
323 Compare, e.g., Banner AMU, 513 U.S. at 26 (setting forth petitioner's unitary request
for contractual vacatur), with Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933 (stating that one party to arbitration
agreement urged court to undertake review not sanctioned by statute or precedent).
326 Bon ner Mall, 513 U.S. at 20.
so See id. at 26.
328 See, e.g., Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 989-91.
328 Compare, e.g., Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 20 (describing party's request for contractual
vacatur of precedent), with Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930 (setting forth party's request for contrac-
tual standard of review).
350 See, 343 F.3d at 65.
531 Sec Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
332 See Banner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26-27,29.
"3 See, e.g., UHC NIgnit, Co. v, Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992,998 (8th Cir, 1998).
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dant protective processes, in favor of efficient. arbitral resolution." 4
Under Bonner Mall, the uncoerced choice to opt into arbitration and its
concomitant statutory scheme means that parties are at. fault. for failing
to comprehend the foreseeable result of their decision—limited vaca-
tur review of arbitral awards."5 Quite simply, parties' decisions to in-
clude heightened-review clauses in their arbitration agreements do not
present the exceptional vagaries of circumstance that justify the aug-
mentation of judicial procedures that uniformly apply to all citizens." 8
The enforcement of heightened-review clauses also fails to accord
with the public's interest in protecting judicial integrity and encourag-
ing arbitration. 337 Under Bonner Mall, the interest in promoting set-
tlement, presumably even arbitral settlement, can never justify the
abdication of well settled judicial processes." 8 The public expects the
judiciary to act as a principled decisionmaker; when it. does not, the
independence of the judiciary and the value of precedent is called
into question."9 Furthermore, as the Kyocera, Bowen, and Merit courts
noted, the public is entitled to expect that courts, pursuant to con-
gressional command, will protect. the finality of awards under the
FAA.34° Failure to do so undermines arbitral finality and hinders par-
ties' ability to effectively opt out of litigation."' Accordingly, both the
public interest in judicial integrity and in promoting arbitration as a
means of extra-judicial settlement militate strongly in favor of using
Bonner Mall's extraordinary circumstances test to invalidate height-
ened-review clatises. 842
C. Overcoming Scholarly Objections to Bonner Mall Through an Application
ofKaplan and Pro-Arbitration Policy
The managerial litigation and arbitral appellate models each re-
ject the extraordinary circumstances test in favor of approaches that.
purportedly blend pro-arbitration policy with judicial integrity. 348 Both
models assume that the FAA's pro-arbitration policy requires courts to
334 See id.
335 See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26; Aferit, 714 F.2d at 683.
336 See Bonner Malt, 513 U.S. at 26-27; Merit, 714 F.2d at 681.
337 See, e.g., Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934.
338 See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 27-28.
339 See id. at 26-27.
346 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935; Merit, 714 F.2d at 683.
341 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935; Merit, 714 F.2d at 683.
342 See Bonner Mail, 513 U.S. at 26-27, 29; Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997-1000.
343 See Cole, supra note 8, at 1260, 1263; van Gin kel, supra note 8, at 188-90, 198.
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acquiesce to heightened-review clauses.344
 The managerial litigation
model, however, attempts to preserve judicial integrity by requiring
heightened-review litigants to provide courts with a sufficient arbitral
record and by refusing to enforce heightened-review clauses that do
not mandate a commonly applied standard of review. 345
 Conversely,
the arbitral appellate model does not require a record or a particular
standard of review because heightened-review litigants' consent to
courts' review of "arbitral appeals" is sufficient to enforce height-
ened-review clauses under the FAA's broad pro-arbitration policy. 546
Ultimately these approaches are flawed for two reasons: (1) they ig-
nore the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA precedent, which establishes that
standards of review should be crafted in accordance with the institu-
tional advantages of the primary decisionmakers, and (2) they con-
travene pro-arbitration policy by encouraging litigation 
. 347
1. All Proposed Models Ignore the Primary Institutional Advantage of
Arbitration—Finality
In 1995, in Kaplan, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals rule, under which an appellate court
would review a decision confirming an arbitral award for abuse of dis-
cretion and a vacatur decision de novo. 348
 Like the managerial litigation
and arbitral appellate models, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that stan-
dards of review for arbitral awards should be predicated upon the FAA's
pro-arbitration policy. 349 Kaplan teaches, however, that pro-arbitration
policy is not an adequate basis upon which to base a standard of review;
the proper inquiry is not whether a standard of review is likely to pro-
duce a pro-arbitration result, but whether it is compatible with the insti-
tutional advantages of the primary decisionmaker. 350
There are many advantages to arbitration—speed, flexibility, and
privacy—but none of these would be possible without the assurance
that arbitral decisions are final. 3" Indeed, the Kaplan Court noted
that the very purpose of arbitration was final dispute resolution. 352
344
 Sec Cole, supra note 8, at 1260, 1263; van Ginkel, supra note 8, at 192.
343 Cole, supra note 8, at 1260, 1263.
348
 van Gin kel, supra note 8, at 188-89, 192, 197-98.
347 Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 947; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935, 936 11.7; Merit, 714 F.2d at 683.
348
 514 U.S. at 948.
348 Sec id.; Cole, supra note 8, at 1258; van Ginkel, supra note 8, at 197-98.
33°
 See 514 U.S. at 948.
331 See, e.g., Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935, 936 n.7.
332 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942-43.
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The FAA's history, text, structure, legislative history, and the prece-
dents interpreting the FAA bolster the Court's reasoning: each estab-
lishes that the FAA protects finality because there would be little in-
centive to opt for arbitration if a final award—the crux of the arbitral
bargain—were open to a lengthy and expensive collateral attack in
the federal courts.353
In addition, the contractual nature of arbitration illustrates that
its primary institutional advantage is finality. 354 When parties select an
arbitrator, they express their confidence in the arbitrator's ability to
render a final and binding decision in those disputes submitted for
decision. 355 As the Seventh Circuit noted in 1983, in Merit, when the
parties have voluntarily selected the arbitrator and the complexity of
the matter at issue, they have assumed the risk of finality." 6 just as the
U.S. Supreme Court reasoned in Kaplan that administrative agencies'
legal interpretations are to be accorded deferential review because
Congress has empowered them to make public law, se too should
courts maintain the FAA's deference to arbitral awards to ensure that.
parties can reliably call upon arbitrators to make private law. 357 There-
fore, because the extraordinary circumstances test accords with
finality—the primary institutional advantage of arbitration—it should
apply to heightened-review vacatur requests. 358
2. Proposed Models Belie Their Pro-Arbitration Policy Claim
Despite the inability of the courts of appeals to articulate a con-
sistent. standard of review applicable to heightened-review clauses,
there is widespread agreement that disappointed heightened-review
litigants are not without recourse. 559 Even the Ninth Circuit's strin-
gent textualist analysis would allow parties to contract for any number
of intermediate arbitral appellate panels. 36° Although the FAA's pro-
353 Sec, e.g., Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 997-98, 1000; Merit, 714 F.2d at 681.
354 See, e.g., Merit, 714 F.2d at 679, 683.
355 See id.
356 See id. at 683.
357 See Cole, supra note 8, at 1260 (reasoning that courts apply arbitrary and capricious
standard of review to administrative agencies' decisions to ensure minimal judicial interfer-
ence in agency decision making). Compare Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 948 (holding that tinder Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984), admin-
istrative agencies' legal authority triggers deferential review), with Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935
(reasoning that FAA vacatur review HMS( be narrow so public can rely upon arbitral finality).
356 See Merit, 714 F.2d at 682-83.
356 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994, 1000; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936; UHC, 148 F.3d at 998.
360 Sec Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000.
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tection of arbitral finality is manifest, as Volt and Mastrobitono illustrate,
the Act does not require that arbitration be conducted according to
any one set of procedural rules. 361
 Thus, if parties have sufficient rea-
son to fear an egregious arbitral award, they can require that the arbi-
trator be well versed in the applicable law, or that a retired judge or
lawyer hear appeals from arbitrators' decisions—that there are any
number of possibilities for heightened review open to prospective ar-
bitrants suggests that the heightened-review project is unnecessary
and ill conceived.362
 Moreover, as the Kyocera court noted, any claim
that heightened-review clauses further the FAA's pro-arbitration policy
is belied by the clauses' tendency to produce vexatious litigation,
which ultimately discourages parties from resorting to arbitration.363
D. Putting It All Together: Finality, Relative Fault, Judicial Integrity, and
Pro-Arbitration Policy Support the Applicability ofBonner Mall's
Extraordinaty Circumstances Test to Heightened
Standard of Review Clauses
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in 2003, in Schoch v.
Infousa, heightened-review clauses seek extravagant results—alteration
of the FAA and the role of courts and arbitrators—without even the
slightest hint of a congressional mandate and, at best, cryptic prece-
dential support. 364
 These requests pose a severe threat to the viability
of arbitration and judicial integrity, which should be avoided through
the application of Bonner Man extraordinary circumstances test for
four reasons.365
 First, the FAA protects arbitral finality, which is as
valuable to the legal community as precedent. 366
 Were courts to en-
force heightened-review clauses, sophisticated actors would inevitably
include them in arbitral agreements. 367
 If this were allowed, disap-
pointed arbitrants, like the Kyocera Corporation, predictably would
engage in protracted litigation, which would only undermine the vi-
261
 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57-58; liilt, 489 U.S. at 479.
362 Sec Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000; see also Merit, 714 F.2d at 683 (reasoning that parties'
failure to conduct more circumspect review of arbitrator's credentials suggested that con-
tractual vacatur request was mode of avoiding compliance with arbitral award).
965 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998, 1000; sec also Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (reasoning that
procedures that undermine finality of arbitral awards contradict pro-arbitration policy).
361 Schoch, 341 F.3d at 789 & n.3.
366
 See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26-27, 29.
Cowparr Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26 (reasoning that precedent is valuable because it
can be utilized by all citizens), taint Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (reasoning that FAA's assurance
of finality ensures continued viability of arbitration).
367
 See Roadway, 257 F.3d at 297.
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ability of arbitration and increase litigation costs for all commercial
actors.368 Thus, arbitration's importance to the entire legal commu-
nity implies that finality, its'central tenet, should be protected under a
stringent standard of review. 363
The primary importance of finality leads to the second reason
supporting the use of the extraordinary circumstances test—the func-
tional similarity between vacatur by contract at issue in Bonner Mali
and contractually mandated judicial review. 370 Both represent at-
tempts to avoid the foreseeable outcome of a voluntary litigation
avoidance strategy. 371 Moreover, parties' relative fault in forgoing liti-
gation is compounded by asking the federal judiciary to disregard
traditional jurisprudential norms merely to perfect contractual expec-
tadons, thereby severely undermining judicial integrity. 372 Indeed, a
third consideration is that no pro-heightened-review proposals for a
uniform standard of review accord with the U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cision in Kaplan, which mandates an institutional advantage approach
to crafting standards of review and rejects standards primarily crafted
to coincide with the amorphous commands of pro-arbitration pol-
iCy. 373 Because finality is the primary institutional advantage of arbitra-
tion, any standard of review tending to eviscerate finality contravenes
the Court's holding in Kaplad. 374
Finally, the extraordinary circumstances test poses no affront to
fundamental fairness.373 As the Second and Ninth Circuits held, in
Hoeft and Kyocera, although arbitrants may craft arbitral procedures to
suit their needs, they must take the FAA and the precedents interpret-
ing it as they find them. 376 Under Volt, it is clear that despite the delays
inherent in an intricate arbitral appellate process, the courts would
See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 991-94; sec also Merit, 714 F.2d at 682 (stating that confirma-
tion was delayed for eighteen mouths because of contractual vacatur request).
369 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
370 Compare, e.g., Banner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26-27 (holding that vacatur by settlement
forces courts to abdicate judicial role), with Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 65 (reasoning that judicial
standards of review are not property of private litigants), and Schoch, 341 F.3d at 789 n.3
(reasoning that contractual review amends the FAA and changes arbitral practice without
statutory mandate).
371 See Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 64 (citing Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26).
372 See id. at 64-65.
373 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 948.
374 See id.
373 Sec, e.g., Matt, 714 F.2d at 679, 683; sec also WIC, 154 F.3d at 998 (warning parties
that the arbitral bargain is a choice to opt out of adjudication and judicial procedures).
376 Sec Hoeft, 343 F.3d at 65-66 (distinguishing arbitral from judicial procedures); Kyo-
cera, 341 F.3c1 at 1000.
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enforce such an agreement according to its terms under sections 3
and 4 of the FAA.377
 There is no similar authority requiring the en-
forcement of contractual standards of judicial review; indeed, the
great weight of authority militates strongly against extending this ad-
vantage to arbitrants. 378
 Thus, courts need not step in to ensure an
equitable review for which the parties could have contracted. 379
CONCLUSION
The persistent circuit split over the enforceability of heightened
standard of review clauses in arbitration agreements should be resolved
through the application Of the extraordinary circumstances test. The
Second Circuit implicitly applied U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. u Bonner
Mall Partnership's extraordinary circumstances test in 2003, in Hoeft v.
MU, Group, Inc., to strike down a decreased standard of review clause.
In 1994, in Bonner Mall, the U.S. Supreme Court employed this test to
defeat a request to vacate lower court judgments pursuant to a settle-
ment agreement. In addition, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
plied a similar test to defeat a request to vacate a confirmed arbitral
award in accordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement. The
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that
allowing parties to attack an arbitration award pursuant to contract un-
dermines arbitral finality and judicial integrity. The history of arbitral
awards, and the FAA's text, structure, and legislative history, as well as
the precedents interpreting the FAA, support the conclusion of these
anti-heightened-review courts. Therefore, because the FAA's limited
vacatur review is as important to the legal community as precedent, and
because arbitrants can contract for arbitral appellate review, the courts
should adopt Banner Mall's extraordinary circumstances test to establish
a consistent analytical framework for rejecting heightened-review
clauses. Adopting such a consistent course would alleviate confusion,
increase bargaining efficiency, and preserve judicial integrity.
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